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Roles of Interstate Water Pollution Control Commissions

Blaser, Zeni and Co, Chicago, Ill

Prepared for

Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D C Div of Water Planning

Feb 75

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Roles of

INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL COMMISSIONS

Pursuant to P.L. 92-500

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

BLASER, ZENI & CO. | CONSULTANTS TO MANAGEMENT

One North La Salle Street
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February 1975

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February 17, 1975

Mr. Edward F. Richards
Project Officer
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401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460

Dear Mr. Richards:

Accompanying this letter is the final report of the "Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission Study" conducted by our firm and sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under Contract Number 68-01-3107.

The six Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions funded by EPA were the principal subject of the study. At issue was which water pollution control functions are better administered by the states, and which by the IWPCCCs. To the extent that EPA would change their policy as to roles supported, there are implications as to the EPA operating fund grants between the states and the IWPCCCs.

This is a complex subject about which there is a wide variety of opinion.

As former chief executive of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, I am well aware of the complexities of the federal-state-interstate relationship.

Extensive discussion will be necessary to clarify divergent viewpoints. We believe this report will precipitate such discussion. The resulting debate, if conducted with a constructive attitude, can simplify the necessary policy determination.

We received excellent cooperation from all concerned - particularly the chief executives of the six commissions. Each is an outstanding pollution control executive; the problems they face do not result from any failing on their part, but from the institutional constraints under which they operate.

Phil Zeni and the remainder of our staff express our appreciation to you for your excellent cooperation and help.

Cordially,

Bill Blaser

William L. Blaser
President

WLB:cd

ib

Roles of

INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION COMPACT COMMISSIONS

Pursuant to P.L. 92-500

Contract 68-01-3107

by

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One North LaSalle Street
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February 1975

jc

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I.	Introduction	1
II.	Approach and Methodology	7
III.	Findings and Conclusions	12
IV.	Recommendations	20
V.	Main Text	42
VI.	Appendix	101

I. INTRODUCTION

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-500) established a nation-wide strategy for achieving water pollution control - a strategy that was designed to be comprehensive and integrated - comprehensive in that it covered all areas of the nation, integrating the various functional elements needed for a successful program.

The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was mandated to supervise and implement this strategy as outlined in the Act.

This supervision and implementation called for the utilization of the organizational resources of the EPA, the state and territorial governments, interstate water pollution control compact commissions, as well as, various regional and local units of government.

Although the resources which have been made available by the federal government for these efforts are large, they are not unlimited. Neither are the scarce resources of time and qualified personnel.

Not fully realized by all concerned is the fact that funds given to the interstate water pollution control compact commissions (IWPCCC's) would otherwise go to the states, the District of Columbia and six territories. In effect all fifty states contribute (through reduced federal funding) to the six IWPCCC's but only seventeen at least partially recoup this loss through membership. Even among signatories, the burden is uneven; every signatory state contributes indirectly to all six compact commissions, while a number of signatories belong to and receive potential benefits from just one IWPCCC.

Therefore, as the EPA has undertaken to develop policies associated with supervision and implementation of a broad-ranging water pollution control program, it has been cognizant that there is a need to optimize resource utilization.

Prior to the enactment of P.L. 92-500, the EPA assisted other levels of government in both the operation of water pollution control programs and construction of sewage treatment facilities. Such assistance included cost-sharing funding for the operation of both state and interstate agency program operation.

Much of this funding took the form of grants to certain states and interstates which performed similar program functions within the same geographical areas.

The authority and responsibility to continue these grant programs was continued with the advent of P.L. 92-500.

In order to clarify the issues and opportunities associated with state and interstate performance of similar (and in some cases identical) functions within the same geographic boundaries, the EPA has authorized that a study be conducted for use in reevaluating its policies in this area.

This report is the result of that study and has been designed to provide an objective review of the issues involved and a series of recommendations which may be used as a basis for policy development in the future.

The study was conducted during the winter of 1974-75 and, in part, is built upon an earlier study completed by Blaser, Zeni & Co. in early 1974.

The earlier study, Roles, Coordination and Funding of Six Interstate Water Compact Commissions, provided a brief overview of the central issues associated with the existence and operation of both state and interstate agencies in the water pollution control field; it provided a display of policy options available to the EPA in roles, coordination and funding.

The current study covered by this report is a more intensive review as a result of substantially expanded field investigations and data review. It requires the contractor to:

> "recommend to EPA which functions of interstate commissions appear to be particularly appropriate to those institutions and which current or planned functions of interstate commissions appear to be better left to state agencies. In making such a recommendation the contractor shall consider his factual findings in the light of the requirements of state agencies set forth in P.L. 92-500 and in applicable regulations of EPA."

Background of the Issues

Most fundamentally, in the Northeastern portion of the United States, there exists at the state and interstate levels of government, 18 signatories (17 states and the District of Columbia) to six water pollution control compacts. These six compacts have created six commissions whose operations and geographic perimeters cover all or some of each of the signatories' jurisdictions.

Through P.L. 92-500, each of the signatory states and the District of Columbia are charged with the primary responsibility for assuring performance of a water pollution control program that is functionally comprehensive and covers its entire geographic territory.

Conversely, the six interstate agencies operate programs which perform only selected functions within selected areas. There is a lack of uniformity in the functions performed among the interstate agencies and a lack of uniformity in the functions performed jointly by the interstate agencies and their signatories.

Further, the interstate compacts have, as a point of commonality, a major river basin in only some cases. Even in those cases where a river basin has been used to gather signatories to a compact, some states have chosen not to join with the others. An example of this situation exists in the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO), where Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina and Mississippi, each contain waterways which are ultimately tributary to the Ohio River, yet do not belong to the Commission. The portions of the Ohio basin contained in each of these states are in some instances small, yet the point remains that ORSANCO represents only a portion of the states with waterways which contribute to water pollution control in the Ohio River.

As was previously mentioned, the six interstate water pollution control compact commissions studies in this project cover the approximately Northeastern one-fourth of the country, the remaining three-fourths of the nation have no commissions of this particular type.

If the presence of a major interstate river requires the existence of an interstate water pollution control commission, then such notable areas as the Mississippi River Basin, the Missouri River Basin, the Colorado River Basin and many others require formation of new compact commissions.

With P.L. 92-500 mandating the development and operation of a comprehensive, integrated water pollution control effort nationwide, the need to review the existence, operation and future roles of interstate agencies is apparent. P.L. 92-500, additionally, makes several references to the interstate bodies in addition to the states and, hence, a need to address the issues involved is emphasized.

For the purposes of this study and the report, the concept of an "integrated, comprehensive water pollution control program" is used to mean one which includes and jointly interrelates from a responsibility/authority role all of the major functions on a continuing basis throughout an agency's territorial boundaries.

The major functions in this context include:

standard setting;
permitting;
surveillance (field inspection and effluent monitoring);
enforcement;
operator training;
water quality monitoring; and
planning (including modelling, waste load allocation and other planning)

The existence and performance of these functions were examined in this study to determine to what extent the interstate agencies performed such functions, to what extent they were operated as part of an integrated, comprehensive water pollution control program, and to what extent they were duplicative of functions performed by the states.

Another important issue addressed by this study is the subject of non-point water pollution sources (NPS).

P.L. 92-500 requires that NPS be factored into the operation of water pollution control programs, as necessary, and, subsequently, one task required in the fulfilling of the contract for this study was the investigation of the potential for interstate agency involvement with the issue of NPS.

Although, not explicit in terms of contractural requirements, implicitly the areas under study required consideration of the operation of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) as set forth in P.L. 92-500.

Throughout this study three dilemmas frequently surfaced in discussions:

a. How should necessary interstate coordination be achieved throughout the entire nation--for areas outside as well as inside areas of IWPCCC's?

b. Should water pollution control be administered on watershed boundaries or on political (state) boundaries?

c. Should IWPCCC's approach their mission as one of water quality management or of water resource management?

Many of the differences of opinion encountered were based on differing perceptions as to the answers to the above three fundamental questions.

II. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The approach and methodology of this study was controlled by the contractual requirements contained in the Statement of the Objectives of the Study coupled with the Statement of Work.

Objectives of the Study

"EPA currently partially funds, through Section 106 monies, the activities of six interstate water pollution control commissions. The amount of funding for interstates and the percentage of such funding for each commission were determined prior to the passage of P.L. 92-500. Consequently, the general objective of the proposed study is to reexamine EPA's funding policy in light of the requirements of the Act.

"In particular, EPA seeks to determine whether or not there is a set of functions which appear to be especially suited to the capabilities of interstates. The verification of such functions would tend to imply that other functions are more suited to State implementation. Conversely, a study of functions may reveal that interstates are highly individualistic organizations which perhaps reflect conditions peculiar to different river basins and which do not conform to any general pattern."

Statement of Work

"Task 1. A thorough review of the legal authority under which each of the following interstate water pollution control commissions operate: Susquehanna River Basin Commission, Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, Interstate Sanitation Commission, Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission and the Delaware River Basin Commission. A review should also be made of the fiscal year 1975 program plan for each of the commissions.

"Task 2. The contractor shall determine what functions each interstate commission is performing in FY 75 and intends to perform in FY 76 and shall estimate the resources (in dollars and man years) being devoted by each interstate commission to each function. These determinations shall be made in the course of contractor visits to each interstate commission and by discussions during these visits with commission staff.

"Task 3. The contractor shall determine the degree of overlap between the functions performed by each interstate commission and the functions performed by the signatory states of each interstate compact. This determination shall be made in the course of contractor visits to at least 50% of the signatory states to each compact. During these visits the contractor shall conduct discussions with officials of the appropriate state agency or agencies as well as with state commissioners of each interstate commission.

"Task 4. The contractor shall analyze the findings regarding each interstate commission to determine the relative importance of each function performed by that commission together with the degree of overlap between the commission and the state agency or agencies. Where redundancy exists the contractor shall determine whether redundancy of function between the commission and the agency or agencies is productive in terms of water pollution abatement achievements or is simply duplicative and wasteful of resources.

"Task 5. The contractor shall in his discussions with the interstate commissions, the state agencies, and the state commissioners, explore the potential role of interstate commissions in abating non-point source pollution. A summary of the contractor's findings shall be contained in his final report to EPA.

> "Task 6. The contractor shall recommend to EPA which functions of interstate commissions appear to be particularly appropriate to those institutions and which current or planned functions of interstate commissions appear to be better left to state agencies. In making such a recommendation the contractor shall consider his factual findings in the light of the requirements of state agencies set forth in P.L. 92-500 and in applicable regulations of EPA."

Based on the above, a systematic approach was made to gather facts and opinions from a wide range of resources.

There is a considerable body of literature on the subject of such compact commissions, and much of it was reviewed. (See Appendix for bibliography)

Insights and opinions were solicited by mail from every commissioner of the six compact agencies, and also from the chief water pollution control official of every signatory. Personal interviews were conducted with each of the six executive directors and selected staff members of the commission.

Although contractual requirements required interviews with water pollution control officials of nine states, officials of twelve states were interviewed.

Additionally, each of the lead USEPA Regional Offices was visited and interviews conducted with appropriate personnel. This activity was not required by the Statement of work, but the Project Team felt that potentially greater insight could be achieved through these interviews.

Further, additional interviews were conducted with officials in other governmental units, such as the Council on Environmental Quality and the National Commission on Water Quality. (See appendix for list of persons who contributed to this study through interviews or by mail.)

We pursued this broad range of sources of fact, insights, and opinions because of the complexity of the problems and opportunities connected with interstate water pollution control compact commissions - no one person or group could be expected to clearly see all aspects.

Field interviews were supplemented by additional data solicited by mail as analysis developed.

Each of the signatories, interstate agencies, EPA regional offices concerned, and several necessary EPA headquarters personnel were given opportunity to provide input into this study.

Further, the most pertinent information gathered on the survey instruments were revalidated with their appropriate sources to minimize the possibility of misinterpretation.

Throughout the study, we received excellent cooperation from all concerned. We were particularly struck by the quality of the executive directors of the six interstate compact agencies. They were obviously highly intelligent, knowledgable in their field, and dedicated to carrying out the responsibilities of their commission in their compact area.

At various steps during the conduction of the assignment both the Project Officer and key EPA regional personnel met with representatives of Blaser, Zeni & Co. for the purpose of providing additional insight and reviewing the tentative findings and tentative recommendations.

Nevertheless, though the views of many were solicited, the conclusions and recommendations are those of Blaser, Zeni & Co. and not necessarily those of persons interviewed.

III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Questions regarding water pollution control of streams which cross state lines affect not only those covered by interstate compact commissions, but the remaining interstate streams as well.

Interstate streams exist throughout the country, yet more than three-quarters of the nation's areas do not have any IWPCCCs.

2. EPA does not have the power to prohibit any IWPCCC from carrying out the provisions of its compact.

Any such action would require congressional approval.

3. All six IWPCCC's were formed before passage of P.L. 92-500, none after.

Since the compacts preceded P.L. 92-500, it is understandable that the compact mandated certain functions to IWPCCC which Congress later mandated the states to carry out.

Even though P.L. 92-500 was designed to provide a nationwide comprehensive strategy for water pollution control, it does not seem to have precipitated formation of other such commissions.

4. Federal and state water pollution control legislation has been substantially changed over the past ten years, the compact documents (and enabling legislation) generally have not.

5. All six compacts preceded passage of P.L. 92-500.

Duplicative and uncoordinated assignments can easily result unless federal, state, and compact legislation are reconciled. Passage of P.L. 92-500 and EPA administrative policies have substantially reconciled federal/state legislative strategies; as yet, the operations of the IWPCCCs do not appear to be fully integrated into a federal/state/interstate strategy.

6. P.L. 92-500 was designed to be a nationwide strategy to control water pollution on a comprehensive, integrated basis.

As such, it contains extensive guidance as to the assignment of responsibilities in the field of water pollution control so as to avoid fragmented, non-comprehensive, non-integrated activities.

7. In regard to the dilemma as to "how should necessary interstate coordination in water pollution control be achieved throughout the country?" P.L. 92-500 contains no explicit guidance, other than the Section 209 Basin Planning.

Other than in basin planning, it would appear optional whether this is obtained by voluntary cooperation among affected states, by EPA persuasion, or through the activities of IWPCCCs.

In the case of basin planning, the responsibility for such coordination is assigned to the Water Resources Council, which may delegate such responsibility to other agencies.

8. In regard to the dilemma as to "Should water pollution control be administered on watershed or on political (state) boundaries?" P.L. 92-500 contains clear guidance in Section 101(b):

> "It is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution,. . ."

The strategy reflects that in this difficult dilemma Congress has opted for the concept that better water pollution control can be achieved by giving higher priority to coordination within a state's boundaries rather than to coordination on watershed boundaries.

> 9. Congress has chosen to concentrate activities of the EPA in water quality management rather than the broader area of water resource management.

Apart from water quality management, Congress has assigned the majority of water resource activities to agencies other than the EPA. P.L. 92-500 is a further reflection of this policy. This has obvious implications as to the support the EPA can give to non-water quality activities of IWPCCCs.

> 10. Each state for its entire area is responsible for executing a comprehensive, integrated water quality program.
>
> 11. Each state may delegate some functions to an IWPCCC.

The responsibility assigned to each state is for development of a program and its execution. This may be achieved through delegation to an IWPCCC.

> 12. Although a state has the responsibility for performance of all functions in all its areas, IWPCCCs have the option of being selective, performing some functions for part of the compact area.

To the extent the various water pollution control functions interrelate to achieve an effective program, the states represent a better institutional mechanism to bring to bear a coordinated attack on water pollution occurring within a state's boundaries.

> 13. No interstate compact commission for its entire area is responsible for having a comprehensive, integrated water quality program.

For example, in the national strategy, financial support is provided for construction of sewage treatment plants, but no IWPCCC conducts a program of grant administration.

Additionally, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) is a major part of the nationwide strategy. No interstate agency is currently responsible for the NPDES implementation within its territorial jurisdiction. However, permits are being granted pursuant to the system by State or state/federal programs. These permits result in discharge into waterways within the interstates' areas.

Further, to the extent an IWPCCC does perform given functions, such performance is usually limited to only a portion of its area, such as the main stem of its namesake river, but does not include the tributaries.

> 14. Compact commissions do provide a coordinating mechanism among the states - one that is accepted without resentment.

The attitude of state officials toward coordination by the IWPCCCs is friendly, contrasted with a somewhat resentful attitude reported toward EPA coordinating efforts. This contrast has been attributed to the compulsive powers available to EPA as opposed to the general lack of compulsive powers of the IWPCCCs.

> 15. Compact commissions have provided a forum for exchange of ideas and information among senior state water pollution control officials.

The value of such informal educational sessions should not be underestimated.

16. Compact commissions represent a vehicle for awarding contracts more promptly than either the states or EPA.

This has been a real advantage particularly when funds unexpectedly become available on short notice. By not having to go through the state legislative process or the bidding procedures of state or federal governments, considerable time can be saved.

17. Compact commissions either do not have enforcement authority, or if they do, they exercise it sparingly.

For example, ORSANCO, which has had enforcement powers for 25 years, has brought nine enforcement cases during this period.

18. Funds given to the interstate water pollution control compact commissions (IWPCCC's) would otherwise go to the states. In effect all fifty states contribute (through reduced federal funding) to the six IWPCCC's but only seventeen at least partially recoup this loss through membership. Even among signatories, the burden is uneven; every signatory state contributes to all six compact commissions, while a number of states belong to just one IWPCCC.

If these funds were to be transferred to the fifty states, this may or may not result in a net gain to a signatory. To the extent a signatory would have to increase its expenditures because an IWPCCC ceased performing a function, the additional state expenditure would have to be taken into consideration.

> 19. Each of the subject commissions had some differences from the others; each had some similarities with all others. These differences or similarities can affect the policies of the EPA toward the commissions.

Obviously they all have differences, covering different sections of the country; equally obviously they all have similarities each dealing with water pollution. The fact that there are differences does not preclude some uniform policies as long as they are addressed to common problems faced or functions performed.

> 20. Of the six compact commissions, SRBC, DRBC, ORSANCO, and ICPRB are each organized on the concept of a major river basin.
>
> ISC is organized on the basis of the salt waters of New York Harbor and Long Island Sound.
>
> NEIWPCC is organized on the basis of the political boundaries of the six New England states, plus a small portion of New York State adjacent to Lake Champlain.

These charactistics modify the mission performed by each. For example, NEIWPCC is in the best position to comprehensively receive delegated state functions, in that it could cover the entire area of any of its six New England States.

> 21. It appears clear that, under P.L. 92-500, EPA is required to disburse some Section 106 funds to IWPCCCs. However, EPA does have some latitude in determining how much goes to the IWPCCCs.

Under present legislation, it would appear that EPA does not have the policy option of withdrawing all financial assistance from IWPCCCs.

> 22. Almost everyone interested felt that IWPCCCs performed valuable services -- although there was some difference of opinion as to what functions they should perform, and some who felt value received was not worth the cost.

Of those involved, there was quite a range of opinion. The strongest proponents tended to be, most naturally, staff members of the IWPCCCs; those with the most reservations were those who were least closely connected with commissions.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

> Recommendation #1: That, for the prevention and control of pollution, EPA should encourage interstate water pollution control compact commissions (IWPCCCs) among the states.

Sec 103(a) of P.L. 92-500 states "The Administrator shall ...encourage compacts between the States for the prevention of pollution." The intent of Congress is clear and it would appear that such encouragement extends to both existing compacts and to areas not yet covered by compacts.

> Recommendation #2: That EPA be guided in its determination of which IWPCCC functions to support by the congressional intent expressed in P.L. 92-500 as "the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,..."

This is one of the most basic elements in the national water pollution control strategy. Congress has assigned to the states--not the interstates--the full range of functions that make up an integrated attack on water pollution. Congress has directed that water pollution control be administered primarily on political (State) boundaries, not on watershed boundaries.

Further, by assigning such responsibilities to the states, complete geographic coverage is assured.

This does not mean that the some functions cannot be delegated to other organizations, such as IWPCCCs. However, such delegation does not relieve the states of the responsibility of assuring that delegated functions are properly executed. Because such delegation does not relieve the state of its primary responsibilities, what functions are delegated, and for what areas, is left to the discretion of the states.

> Recommendation #3: That EPA be guided in its funding support of IWPCCCs by congressional intent expressed in P.L. 92-500 as "the policy of Congress... to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to State and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection with the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution."

That portion of Section 101(b) quoted above makes clear the responsibility of the EPA to provide financial support to IWPCCCs.

The authority of EPA to determine the scope of such funding is outlined in the Main Text, page 55.

> Recommendation #4: That EPA policy in regard to functions supported in IWPCCC be different between:
>
> a. Yet to be formed commissions; and
> b. existing commissions

To the extent that recent changes in legislation and strategies have modified the functions which EPA should support, sudden changes in policy should be avoided. Both the states and IWPCCCs are committed to their current continuing programs, and it will take time to modify this balance between them.

Newly formed commissions can be supported based on the most recently developed policies; any changes of policy toward existing commissions should take place through an evolutionary transition period.

Recommendation #5: That, in both newly-formed and existing IWPCCCs, EPA should support the coordination function to the extent interstate coordination is needed to achieve the objectives of P.L. 92-500.

This function for IWPCCCs was more uniformly approved than any other in discussions with state personnel, commission personnel, and outside observers. To the extent coordination within a basin is desirable, the IWPCCCs are an excellent vehicle to perform such function and should be supported in this role. The coordinating function itself is a coordination of the various functions performed by the individual states of the commission area.

Those most applicable to interstate streams are coordination of water quality standards and monitoring activities.

An example of lack of such coordination in water quality standards is reported for a river having thermal standards differing by three degrees at the Arkansas-Texas boundary. Incidentally, this example lies in an area not covered by an IWPCCC.

Coordination among states within a compact area, regarding the monitoring function, would be most helpful in determining sampling locations, parameters measured, frequency of sampling, standardization of testing procedures, and data accumulation and retrieval.

Although states may achieve their coordination on a voluntary basis, the disadvantages of any duplication by IWPCCCs would appear to be outweighed by the anticipated benefits.

> Recommendation #6: That, in both newly-formed and existing IWPCCCs, EPA should support the function of providing a forum for information interchange to achieve the objectives of P.L. 92-500.

Altogether apart from the other benefits of the IWPCCCs is the formal and informal exchanges among senior officials as to common problems and techniques for dealing with them.

It is true that there are other forums and convocations; to that extent, meetings of IWPCCCs for this purpose would be duplicative. Nevertheless, so many persons interviewed so strongly supported this benefit that it appears that the need is not being adequately satisfied through alternate means.

> Recommendation #7: That, in both newly-formed and existing IWPCCCs, EPA should encourage IWPCCCs to seek to be designated as the Section 209 basin planning agency in those basins where such assignment has not yet been made to viable agencies to achieve the objectives of P.L. 92-500.

The benefits of basin planning are apparent and reflected in the massive funding made available in Section 209 through the Water Resources Council. In two of the subject commissions (ORSANCO and NEIWPCC), there exists planning commissions established under Title II of the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, and this opportunity would not appear available to ORSANCO and NEIWPCC. Nevertheless, NEIWPCC was assigned and paid to complete a portion of this basin planning effort. For existing or new commissions, there may be opportunities to participate extensively in this basin planning process.

> Recommendation #8: That, in both newly-formed and existing IWPCCCs, EPA should support the function of preparing or supervising the preparation of mathematical models for further use in meeting the planning requirements to achieve the objectives of P.L. 92-500.

The river basin is the natural unit for mathematical modelling to better achieve the planning objectives in effective water pollution control. Basins which are entirely within one state could be modelled by the state, but the larger areas covering more than one state requires an interstate agency or its equivalent.

> Recommendation #9: That, in both newly-formed and existing IWPCCCs, EPA should support the function, where necessary to achieve the objectives of P.L. 92-500, of performing the wasteload allocation among affected states, but not within the boundaries of a state.

In the critical matter of waste-load allocation between states, the consequences of various allocations can be so significant as to make agreement difficult between even the best-natured of negotiators. Some arbitrator will be necessary. Short of resort to the courts, an IWPCCC would appear best suited to formulate this difficult decision.

Recommendation #10: That, in both newly-formed and existing IWPCCCs, EPA should support the function of reviewing monitoring data, not only for the amount necessary for performing functions of the IWPCCCs, but additionally as a device through which signatory states can "hold accountable" the various states in the compact area for achieving the objectives of P.L. 92-500. Performance of this function by an interstate compact commission should be supported by EPA even if it is duplicative of state review for the same area.

The states are charged with a continuing review of the water quality data within their state boundaries. Some of the water quality problems in some state waters emanate from other states, and merely reviewing a state's own data is not effective in determining the sources of the problem in such situations.

Each state should perform review of its own data for its own water pollution control purposes. A comprehensive basinwide review by the interstate can identify some of the water pollution control problems of which the subject state may be unaware, and can also provide pertinent information to downstream states.

> Recommendation #11: That, in both newly-formed and existing IWPCCCs, EPA should not oppose the delegation by a state of any function required of a state by P.L. 92-500 to an interstate water quality compact commission, providing such delegation not be considered as relieving the state of the responsibility that the function be properly performed.

It is clear that EPA does not have authority under the law to prohibit a IWPCCC from performing functions assigned to it by signatories and permitted by enabling legislation.

Apart from the question of statutory power, we believe that situations among the states and interstates vary so widely that it is better to let individual states delegate functions to the interstates, providing the states can give adequate assurances that these delegated functions will be performed well.

> Recommendation #12: That, in both newly-formed and existing IWPCCCs, EPA should support selected research projects based on availability of specialized staff within an IWPCCC or the unique contracting abilities of the IWPCCC.

Ordinarily, there would be no advantage to EPA giving funds to an IWPCCC who, in turn, merely passes such funds on to a research contractor. In such a situation, there would need to be a project officer at EPA to supervise a project officer at the IWPCCC who would supervise a contractor. Such duplication not only would be wasteful of scarce talent, but the additional link in the chain could lead to delay or misunderstanding.

However, there does exist an opportunity for IWPCCC to contribute substantially to research projects funded by EPA. First and foremost is using the extensive knowledge and skills of the staff members of the IWPCCCs to actually perform some of or all of a research project.

Further, the IWPCCCs represent a unique vehicle for awarding research contracts, having some significant advantages over the EPA and the states. When time is important, a contract probably can be awarded more quickly through an IWPCCC, by dispensing with the legislative appropriation process of the typical state or all the steps required in EPA contract awards. Care should be taken to protect against losing the safeguards built into the more time-consuming process.

Recommendation #13: That, for existing IWPCCCs, EPA should, at least for an interim period of some years, continue to support directly other functions currently supported, even though such functions are not recommended for support in recommendations 5 through 10 inclusive.

Both the states and IWPCCCs are committed to their current continuing programs, and it will take time to modify this balance. Any changes in support policies should take place through an evolutionary transition period.

Recommendation #14: That, in the performance of the water quality standard setting function, EPA should provide support directly to the states; the interstate commissions may provide assistance and advice to the state but the principal responsibility resides with the state in accordance with P.L. 92-500.

This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

P.L. 92-500 assigns to the states the responsibility for this function. IWPCCCs still have authority to set standards stricter than those set by the states, but this power has been seldom used since passage of P.L. 92-500.

Recommendation #15: That, in the performance of the permitting function, EPA should provide support directly to the states. P.L. 92-500 already provides review by EPA in addition to that required of the states; a third review by IWPCCCs for water quality administrative purposes should not be supported by EPA.

This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The permits are reviewed both by the issuing states and by EPA. Review by a third party for water quality administrative purposes would be not merely duplicative, but triplicative.

It may be appropriate for an IWPCCC to review permits for water resource management purposes other than water quality. However, in such cases financial support for these functions should not be provided from EPA water quality funds.

Recommendation #16: That, in the performance of the surveillance (field inspection and compliance monitoring) function, EPA should provide support directly to the states; delegation of this function by a state may be made to an interstate compact commission but such delegation should not be construed as relieving the state of its responsibility for assuring that this function is properly performed in accordance with P.L. 92-500.

This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The signatories have the responsibility for their entire geographic area for recruiting, training, and supervising a force of field inspectors, and further for developing the laws, regulations, and policies to support this force.

To transfer performance of this function to an IWPCCC for a portion of the state's geographic area would not reduce total governmental expenditure; instead it would require an extra layer of administrative expense at the commission level.

More importantly, because the field inspection activities should be integrated with other water quality functions such as the state's statutory enforcement powers, such functional delegation would fragment an integrated approach and probably would diminish the effectiveness of the national water pollution control program in the geographical area delegated.

Recommendation #17: That, in the performance of the enforcement function, EPA should provide support directly to the states; delegation of this function by a state may be made to an interstate compact commission but such delegation should not be construed as relieving the state of its responsibility for assuring that this function is properly performed in accordance with P.L. 92-500.

This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The signatories have the responsibility for performing this function throughout the signatories' geographic area.

To transfer performance of this function to an IWPCCC for a portion of the state's geographic area would not reduce total governmental expenditure; instead it would require an extra layer of administrative expense at the commission level.

More importantly, the IWPCCCs which have had enforcement powers have shown a reluctance to exercise them.

Most importantly, because enforcement activities should be integrated in the other water quality functions such as permit issuance, such functional delegation would fragment an integrated approach and probably would diminish the effectiveness of the national water pollution control program in the geographical area delegated.

> Recommendation #18: That, in the performance of the operator training function, EPA should provide support directly to the states; delegation of this function by a state may be made to an interstate compact commission but such delegation should not be construed as relieving the state of its responsibility for assuring that this function is properly performed in accordance with P.L. 92-500.
>
> This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The signatories have the responsibility for providing an operator training program for their entire geographic area to fulfill this responsibility.

In most states, to transfer performance of this function to an IWPCCC for a portion of the state's geographic area would not reduce total governmental expenditure; instead it would require an extra layer of administrative expense at the commission level.

More importantly because the operator training activities should be integrated with other water quality functions such as statewide operator certification programs, such functional delegation would fragment an integrated approach and probably would diminish the effectiveness of the national water pollution control program in the geographical area delegated.

However, some states which have a relatively small population base may want to delegate administration of operator training to an outside agency such as an IWPCCC and should be allowed to do so.

> Recommendation #19: That, in the performance of the sample collection function, EPA should provide support directly to the states; delegation of this function by a state may be made to an interstate compact commission but such delegation should not be construed as relieving the state of its responsibility for assuring that this function is properly performed in accordance with P.L. 92-500.
>
> This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The signatories have the responsibility for their entire geographic area for recruiting, training, and supervising a force of sample collectors, and further for developing the policies and procedures to support this force.

To transfer performance of this function to an IWPCCC for a portion of the state's geographic area would not reduce total governmental expenditure; instead it would require an extra layer of administrative expense at the commission level.

More importantly, because the sample collection activities should be integrated with other water quality functions such as sample analysis and water quality standards, such functional delegation would fragment an integrated approach and probably would diminish the effectiveness of the national water pollution control program in the geographical area delegated.

Exhibits II through VII inclusive (see Appendix) provide more interesting insight into the monitoring programs conducted by the commissions:

a. There are a number of monitoring stations operating in the commission's area, whose data does not go into the commission's data bank on a regular basis. (We believe ORSANCO should also be marked yes because states collect extensive data on the tributaries.)

b. SRBC, ORSANCO, NEIWPCC, and ICPRB do not operate any collection system with commission personnel, drawing on services of paid contractors, other governmental bodies, and miscellaneous services.

The significance of this is:

a. that the programs do not utilize all the data for the commission area as a whole

b. that, if desirable, those not operated by commission personnel could relatively easily transmit their data to another collecting point.

> Recommendation #20: That, in the performance of the sample analysis function, EPA should provide support directly to the states; delegation of this function by a state may be made to an interstate compact commission but such delegation should not be construed as relieving the state of its responsibility for assuring that this function is properly performed in accordance with P.L. 92-500.
>
> This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The signatories have the responsibility for their entire geographic area for supervising analytical laboratories, and further for developing the policies and procedures to support these laboratories.

To transfer performance of this function to an IWPCCC for a portion of the state's geographic area would not reduce total governmental expenditure; instead it would require an extra layer of administrative expense at the commission level.

More importantly, because the sample analysis activities should be integrated with other water quality functions such as sample collection and water quality standards, such functional delegation would fragment an integrated approach and probably would diminish the effectiveness of the national water pollution control program in the geographical area delegated.

> **Recommendation #21**: That, in the performance of the data accumulation function, EPA should provide support directly to the states; delegation of this function by a state may be made to an interstate compact commission but such delegation should not be constured as relieving the state of its responsibility for assuring that this function is properly performed in accordance with P.L. 92-500.
>
> This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The signatories have the responsibility for their entire geographic area for staffing, operating, and supervising a data accumulation system.

To transfer performance of this function to an IWPCCC for a portion of the state's geographic area would not reduce total governmental expenditure; instead it would require an extra layer of administrative expense at the commission level.

More importantly, because the data accumulation activities should be integrated with other water quality functions such as sample collection and analysis, such functional delegation would fragment an integrated approach and probably would diminish the effectiveness of the national water pollution control program in the geographical area delegated.

> Recommendation #22: That, in the performance of the planning functions, other than Section 209 basin planning function, EPA should provide support directly to the states; delegation of this function by a state may be made to an interstate compact commission but such delegation should not be construed as relieving the state of its responsibility for assuring that this function is properly performed in accordance with P.L. 92-500.
>
> This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The signatories have the responsibility for supervising performance of this function for their entire geographic area, and further for developing the institutions, regulations, policies and procedures to support the planning function.

To transfer performance of this function to an IWPCCC for a portion of the state's geographic area would not reduce total governmental expenditure; instead it would require an extra layer of administrative expense at the commission level.

More importantly, because the planning activities should be integrated with other water quality functions such as the administration by the states of the construction grant program, such functional delegation would fragment an integrated approach and probably would diminish the effectiveness of the national water pollution control program in the geographical area delegated.

To the extent basin planning is necessary, Section 209 of P.L. 92-500 assigns this responsibility to the President, acting through the Water Resources Council. Responsibilities under this section can be, and have on occasion, been delegated to IWPCCCs.

Recommendation #23: That, in abating non-point source pollution, EPA "recognize, preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the states" to abate non-point source pollution. The interstate water pollution control compact commissions, however, may be particularly appropriate to conduct research projects concerning non-point source pollution.

This policy should be made effective for newly formed IWPCCCs as they are formed; to the extent existing commissions are performing this function, EPA support of this function should gradually be withdrawn over a period of years, relying on the signatories to support this function of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion.

The signatories have the responsibility for their entire geographic area for abating non-point source pollution, including developing the laws, regulations, policies, and staff.

To transfer performance of this function to an IWPCCC for a portion of the state's geographic area would not reduce total governmental expenditure; instead it would require an extra layer of administrative expense at the commission level.

More importantly, because a non-point source pollution abatement program should be integrated with other water quality functions such as the state's statutory enforcement powers, such functional delegation would fragment an integrated approach and probably would diminish the effectiveness of the national water pollution control program in the geographical area delegated.

Recommendation #24: That the USEPA recommend and support a uniform system of accounting for use by the interstate water quality compact agencies; such system should identify costs of performing each major function of water quality management, including its proportional share of general administration.

IWPCCCs perform a number of water quality functions, as well as some non-water quality functions. To the extent EPA policy, under P.L. 92-500 is to fund a proportion of water quality programs accurate accounting of water quality program expenditures is needed.

To the extent EPA policy is to fund a proportion of selected water quality functions, accurate accounting of water quality expenditures by function is needed.

The true costs of performing the water quality functions include not only the direct costs, but a proportionately share of general administration and other indirect costs.

V. MAIN TEXT

SECTION I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This study focused upon the six major interstate water pollution control compact commissions whose geographic boundaries encompass the major waterways of the Northeastern portion of the U.S.

In order to help provide background for the purposes of discussion and decisions concerning these interstate commissions, this portion of the report begins with a brief synopsis of each of the six bodies. In each case, this information was drawn from publications of the respective commission as well as from responses to interview questions asked of commissioners and commission staff members.

Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) - established 1961

Signatories:

1. United States
2. Delaware
3. New Jersey
4. New York
5. Pennsylvania

Members: the Governors, ex officio, and an alternate from each of the signatory states, and one commissioner appointed by the President of the United States

Purposes: "...to develop and effectuate plans, policies and projects relating to the water resources of the basin. It shall adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies for water conservation, control, use and management in the basin. It shall encourage the planning, development and financing of water resources projects according to such plans and policies."

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB) - established 1940

Signatories:

1. District of Columbia
2. Maryland
3. Pennsylvania
4. Virginia
5. West Virginia

Members: three commissioners from each of the signatory bodies and three commissioners appointed by the President of the United States

Purposes: "to conserve, protect and improve, where necessary, the quality of the waters and associated land resources of the Potomac Valley Conservancy District so as to provide for the maximum enjoyment and utilization thereof by the people..."

Interstate Sanitation Commission (ISC) - established 1936

Signatories:

1. Connecticut (since 1941)
2. New Jersey
3. New York

Members: five commissioners appointed from each of the signatory states, pursuant to respective state laws

Purposes: to abate the existing water pollution and control the future water pollution in the tidal water of the New York Metropolitan Area.

New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission (NEIWPCC) - established 1947

Signatories:

1. Connecticut
2. Maine (since 1955)
3. Massachusetts
4. New Hampshire (since 1951)
5. New York (since 1949)
6. Rhode Island
7. Vermont (since 1951)

Members: five commissioners from each signatory state

Purposes: to abate existing pollution and control future pollution in the interstate waters of the New England area.

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB) - established 1940
Signatories:
1. District of Columbia
2. Maryland
3. Pennsylvania
4. Virginia
5. West Virginia

Members: three commissioners from each of the signatory bodies and three commissioners appointed by the President of the United States

Purposes: "to conserve, protect and improve, where necessary, the quality of the waters and associated land resources of the Potomac Valley Conservancy District so as to provide for the maximum enjoyment and utilization thereof by the people..."

Interstate Sanitation Commission (ISC) - established 1936
Signatories:
1. Connecticut (since 1941)
2. New Jersey
3. New York

Members: five commissioners appointed from each of the signatory states, pursuant to respective state laws

Purposes: to abate the existing water pollution and control the future water pollution in the tidal water of the New York Metropolitan Area.

New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission (NEIWPCC) - established 1947
Signatories:
1. Connecticut
2. Maine (since 1955)
3. Massachusetts
4. New Hampshire (since 1951)
5. New York (since 1949)
6. Rhode Island
7. Vermont (since 1951)

Members: five commissioners from each signatory state

Purposes: to abate existing pollution and control future pollution in the interstate waters of the New England area.

Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO) - established 1948

Signatories:

1. Illinois
2. Indiana
3. Kentucky
4. New York
5. Ohio
6. Pennsylvania
7. Virginia
8. West Virginia

Members: three commissioners appointed from each of the signatory states, pursuant to respective state laws and three commissioners appointed by the President of the United States

Purposes: to control future pollution and abate existing pollution in the waters of the Ohio River Valley through the execution of a regional program.

Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SRBC) - established 1970

Signatories:

1. United States
2. Maryland
3. New York
4. Pennsylvania

Members: the governor or the designee of the governor of each signatory state and one member appointed by the President of the United States

Purposes: "...to develop and effectuate plans, policies, and projects relating to the water resources of the basin. It shall adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies for water resources conservation and management in the basin. It shall encourage and direct the planning, development, operation, and subject to applicable laws the financing of water resources projects according to such plans and policies."

There is, generally, a multiplicity of organizations within each of the signatory states and the federal government with which each of the commissions works.

The six interstates are funded from a variety of sources: signatories, EPA, other governmental entities, and small amounts from miscellaneous sources. The receipts and expenditures (actual or budgeted) for the six IWPCCCs covering fiscal years ended 6/30/72, 6/30/73, 6/30/74, 6/30/75 and 6/30/76 are shown in exhibits VIII through XIII in the Appendix.

As can be seen, for the current fiscal year ended 6/30/75 the percentage of total receipts provided by the signatories varied from 18% to 72%; the percentage provided by EPA ranged between 0% and 81%.

The above percentages include research funds provided by EPA and expended outside of what is usually considered an operating budget.

The annual funding from Section 106 of P.L. 92-500 represents a dollar pool of fixed amount, which is divided among the states, territories and interstates. If interstates were not funded through Section 106, each state and territory could be expected to receive a somewhat larger share of the total. However, because interstates are funded out of Section 106 monies, this arrangement has created a situation whereby the signatory states to these six compacts are receiving some offsetting benefits from their respective interstate agencies in exchange for smaller funding amounts.

Thus all of the states west of the Mississippi and the majority of the southern states are simply receiving less funding without concomitant benefits.

The remainder of the Main Text is divided into the following sections:

Section II	Legal Authorities of Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions
Section III	Functions Performed by the Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions
Section IV	Duplication of Functions Performed by States and Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions
Section V	Effect of Duplication
Section VI	Non-Point Source Pollution and The Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions
Section VII	Recommendations as to Which Functions Should Be Performed by States and Which Functions should Be Performed by Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions
Section VIII	Conclusion

SECTION II. LEGAL AUTHORITIES OF INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL COMPACT COMMISSIONS

Introduction

This section reviews the legal effect of various federal and state laws, regulations and court decisions pertinent to the six Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions (IWPCCCs). The purpose of this review is to help identify existing constraints on the EPA with regard to the various policy options for future utilization by the EPA of these agencies in water pollution control and related programs.

Part I discusses the fact that Congress has specifically consented to the Compacts creating the six IWPCCCs and examines the legal effect of those consents. Part II relates the statutory authority creating each IWPCCC to certain identified roles found in pollution control programs. Part III examines the status of these agencies under P.L. 92-500, with particular attention to program grants under Section 106. Part IV examines a potential role for IWPCCCs under Title II of the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965.

Part I. Effect of Currently Applicable Consent of Congress to Six Compacts

Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution states that "No state shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . ." Because of this Constitutional prohibition, the Compacts creating the six IWPCCCs did not become effective until they had been submitted to, and approved by, Congress. The issue raised is whether or not execution of the compacts and the subsequent consent of Congress has any legal effect limiting future actions by Congress or the signatory States.

Effect of Consent of Congress

In brief, the fact that Congress has consented to each of the six compacts places absolutely no restraints on later Congressional actions. Congress could pass laws giving the States or the USEPA exclusive jurisdiction and control over the waters within each IWPCCC. If Congress desired, it could pass a law or resolution simply withdrawing its consent to any or all Compacts creating the IWPCCCs.

Congress has this absolute power for two reasons, both based on the fact that Article I, Section 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution gives Congress the power "To regulate Commerce. . . among the several States". First, the Congressional resolution or Act consenting to each of the subject Compacts specifically stated that the Act of consent in no way reduced the sovereignty or power of the United States. For example, the Act approving the ORSANCO Compact states that "Nothing contained in this Act or in the compact herein approved shall be construed as impairing or affecting the sovereignty of the United States or any of its rights or jurisdiction in and over the area or waters which are the subject of such compact." (Act of July 11, 1940, 54 Stat. 752). In the two Compacts where the United States is a participating signatory (Delaware River Basin Commission and Susquehanna River Basin Commission), Congress reserves the right to unilaterally withdraw from or modify the Compact (Section 1.4 of each Compact).

Secondly, even if Congress approved a Compact without the customer reservation clause, the U. S. Supreme Court has held, in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 58 U. S. 435 (1856), that Congress' exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce allows it to modify or revoke previous compact consents. The case involved an 1852 Act of Congress authorizing the construction of a bridge across the Ohio River. The bridge would interfere with freedom of of navigation on the Ohio, and opponents of the bridge argued that the 1852 Act was void, since Congress had previously given its consent to a compact between Kentucky and Virginia which stated that navigation of the Ohio River would be kept free and common. The Court rejected this argument, stating at page 438:

> The question here is, whether or not the compact can operate as a restriction upon the power of Congress under the Constitution to regulate commerce among the several States. Clearly not. Otherwise Congress and two states would possess the power to modify and alter the Constitution itself.

Effects of Compacts on Member States

Joining a compact agreement has a very significant effect on signatory States. Each State is bound by its obligations under the compact and the other member States may enforce the obligation in court. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565 (1918). In case of a conflict between a compact and a State law, the compact controls, just as a treaty with another nation overrules national law. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938). States continue to be bound by the provisions of the compact until the compact is terminated or the State withdraws from the compact in accordance with the terms of the compact.

Part II. Authority of IWPCCCs To Perform Designated Pollution Control Roles

One of the methods used in the Field Investigation Phase of this study involved the use of a questionnaire for the subject commissions based on performance of seven specified pollution control roles:

1. Standard Setting
2. Permitting
3. Surveillance
4. Enforcement
5. Operator Training
6. Water Quality Monitoring
7. Planning

The Compacts creating each IWPCCC were examined for language containing specific authority to perform each role. Before setting forth the results, some general observations are in order.

First, only Standard Setting, Permitting and Enforcement really lend themselves to a statutory analysis. Specific statutory authority is needed to perform each of these roles. By contrast, any of these commissions could find ample justification and authority to perform the remaining roles from a clause in the Compact directing the IWPCCC to "conduct studies and programs which will identify and correct water pollution problems." The only effective way to determine whether the latter roles are being performed is by in-person investigation.

Second, the roles of Standard Setting and Permitting in these commissions have very little relation to roles of the same name under P.L. 92-500. Section 303 of P.L. 92-500 deals exclusively with the roles of States and EPA in setting water quality standards. IWPCCCs are given no role in the process.

Similarly, while an IWPCCC could conceivably be designated to administer an NPDES program for a multi-state region, no such commission currently has the extensive powers required by Section 402 and EPA regulations thereunder. As an example, no IWPCCC currently has authority to impose or seek criminal penalties for pollution violations. It is unlikely that this authority would be voluntarily granted to the IWPCCCs by its signatories.

Finally, this analysis of the law is limited to the roles of water pollution control functions only. To the extent IWPCCCs are authorized to perform other roles, such as water resource management functions not directly pertinent to pollution control, such functions are not included in this analysis.

Table I summarizes the specific grant of authorities in the compacts of the six studied IWPCCCs.

Table I

Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions

Specific Authority By Function

as of December 31, 1974

	DRBC	ICPRB	ISC	NEIWPCC	ORSANCO	SRBC
Standard Setting	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Permitting	Yes	NSA	NSA	NSA	NSA	Yes
Surveillance	Yes	NSA	Yes	NSA	NSA	Yes
Enforcement	Yes	NSA	Yes	NSA	Yes	Yes
Operator Training	NSA	NSA	NSA	NSA	NSA	NSA
Water Quality Monitoring	Yes	NSA	NSA	NSA	Yes	Yes
Planning	Yes	NSA	Yes	NSA	NSA	Yes

NSA: No specific authority contained in compact, but commission may perform function under implied authority

Yes: Specific authority contained in compact although it may or may not be currently exercised.

Part III. The Effect of P.L. 92-500 On EPA Options Regarding the IWPCCCs

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (33 U.S.C. 1251 et. seq.), more commonly known as P.L. 92-500, is the basic law concerning federal, interstate and state programs designed to control water pollution. P.L. 92-500 also authorizes substantial funding for these programs. Any examination of options open to EPA with regard to IWPCCCs of necessity must concentrate on the applicable provisions of P.L. 92-500. (Although there have been several subsequent amendments to the Act - such as P.L. 93-207 and P.L. 93-243 - these amendments do not change the pertinent provisions of P.L. 92-500 discussed below).

Congress quite obviously had the compact commissions, as well as State programs, in mind when it passed P.L. 92-500.

Most importantly, the Act states that "It is the policy of the Congress . . . .to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to State and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection with the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution." (emphasis added) (Section 101(b)). Furthermore, Section 103(a) states that "the Administrator shall encourage cooperative activities by the States for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, ...and encourage compacts between States for the prevention and control of pollution."

The most important power available to EPA in encouraging the expansion or contraction of roles performed by the IWPCCCs and the States is EPA's administration of the Section 106 program plan funds. Again, Congress specifically mentions the IWPCCCs in the operative provisions. Section 106(a) states that "There are hereby authorized to be appropriated the following sums . . . .for grants to States and to interstate agencies to assist them in administering programs for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution. . . ." Section 106(b) goes on to state that "the Administrator shall make allotments to the several States and interstate agencies in accordance with regulations promulgated by him on the basis of the extent of the pollution problem in the respective States." (Emphasis added). Sections 207 and 205(a) contain very similar language with respect to the authorization and allocation of construction grant funds. Both lower Courts in the case of City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.C.D.C. 1973), affirmed 494 F2d 1033 (C.A.D.C. 1974), appeal pending U.S. Supreme Court, have agreed that the EPA Administrator must allocate (as opposed to expending) all of the funds authorized to be appropriated among the several States. If the Supreme Court affirms, the case will provide a strong precedent that EPA must follow the same procedure with Section 106 funds.

Regardless of the outcome of this case, it is apparent that it is the clear intent of Congress that the IWPCCCs receive a portion of the Section 106 funds. The specific inclusion of interstate agencies in the operative provisions of Section 106, the stated Congressional policy of furnishing financial assistance to interstate agencies in Section 101(b) and the direction to the Administrator to encourage compacts between States in Section 103(a) all support this conclusion. By contrast, interstate agencies are not mentioned with respect to administration of construction grant programs.

Based on the above, it appears clear that, under P.L. 92-500 EPA is required to disburse some Section 106 funds to IWPCCCs. The key questions are how much and under what conditions.

It should be noted that an IWPCCC can be totally barred from receiving Section 106 funds if its annual "non-federal" funding falls below the FY 71 level (106(d), if a Section 309 federally assumed enforcement is in effect (106(f)(2), or if an acceptable program plan for the next fiscal year is not filed (106(f)(3)). The Act exempts the commissions from the 106(e) requirements for monitoring programs and emergency powers, which are required only for the States.

The amounts currently allocated to the IWPCCCs under EPA Regulations (40 CFR 35.558-3) are not insignificant, particularly in times when the federal government is closely scrutinizing all major expenditures. The share of Section 106 funds allocated to ORSANCO (0.671%) exceeds the allocation of eight states. The total percentage allocated to the six commissions (2.558%) is exceeded only by twelve states. If future Section 106 funding will remain stable or be reduced, EPA may wish to reevaluate the return from the 2.558% of Section 106 funds currently going to the IWPCCCs.

Although Congress has clearly stated that some Section 106 funds should go to the IWPCCCs, the EPA has a great deal of latitude in determining how much goes to the IWPCCCs.

First, Section 106(b) states that Administrator shall make allotments "in accordance with regulations promulgated by him on the basis of the extent of the pollution problem in the respective States." Secondly, the annual payments are limited, by Section 106(c)(2), to the reasonable costs as determined by the Administrator of developing and carrying out a pollution program."

EPA is specifically authorized to adopt regulations setting specific criteria for allocation of Section 106 funds. The only condition, that the formula be based on the pollution problems in each State, would indicate that it would be appropriate to set allocation formulas for the States only, and then to deduct any funds paid to IWPCCCs from the allocations of participant States.

As discussed in Part II, the IWPCCCs do not have the authority to perform certain identified roles. If EPA adopted regulations which conditioned receipt of maximum Section 106 funding on performance of all designated roles, and reduced annual funding by set percentages (for example, 25% if no NPDES program) for each role, the total Section 106 funding to IWPCCCs, as well as the comparative funding among specific commissions, might be dramatically changed.

Even where IWPCCCs perform specific roles, such as standard setting, there may often be a duplication of services and personnel between a commission and the State programs of its participants. Funding the IWPCCCs from the State allocations, as suggested previously, would force all parties involved to take a closer look at the cost-effectiveness of duplicating performance of specific roles.

It should be noted that EPA is already moving in this general direction with respect to funding State program plans. The Regulations now identify major program elements (40 CFR 35.554-3) and give States base allocations and incentive allocations depending on their performance of specified roles (40 CFR 35.558-1, 559.1). However, the base allocation is set at each State's FY 73 funding, which reduces the impact on non-responsive States with ineffective programs.

By contrast, the IWPCCC allocation is simply based on the principal that "An amount not less than the FY 1973 level of funding for interstate agencies will be divided among interstate agencies." (40 CFR 35.558-2).

Finally, the Section 106 funding is limited by P.L. 92-500 to the reasonable cost of the pollution control program. Since most such commissions also perform non-pollution control functions, such as water resource planning or flood control, a closer examination of actual pollution control functions performed might lead to Section 106 funding for specific IWPCCCs.

Section 208 and 209

Two other provisions of P.L. 92-500 have special significance for the IWPCCCs.

First, Section 208 outlines requirements for Areawide Waste Treatment Management, including waste load allocation and studies of non-point source pollution and provides substantial funding for carrying out these activities.

To the extent that the designated 208 areas do or will coincide with the geographical areas covered by specific IWPCCCs, these commissions would seem to be ideally suited to perform the Section 208 functions. This could furnish an important source of funding for IWPCCCs without the duplication and the direct competition with participant States that is inherent in Section 106.

Secondly, Section 209(c) authorizes the appropriation of $200,000,000.00 for Level B basin planning under the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965. The potential role of the IWPCCCs under this authorization is discussed in Part IV below.

Part IV. Potential Role Of IWPCCCs Under Water Resources Planning Act of 1965

The Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 (42 USC 1962 et.seq.) created a Water Resources Council, composed of a Chairman appointed by the President, the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, the Army, Health, Education and Welfare and the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission. The Commission is directed to make continuing studies of the adequacy of water supplies within major national regions, to study the relation of the requirements of each major region to the plans and programs within individual river basins and to oversee the creation and functioning of individual River Basin Commissions (RBCs).

Title II of the Act provides that the President, acting on the advice or approval of the Council and the approval of at least one-half of the concerned States, may establish a RBC by executive order. Once created, the RBC is responsible for preparing comprehensive plans for developing the basin's water and related resources and for coordinating all projects within the basin.

Each RBC is composed of a Chairman appointed by the President, representatives of 10 federal agencies, including EPA, a representative of each State in the basin, and a representative of any IWPCCC with responsibilities within the basin. The RBCs are funded by the federal government and the member States.

A number of RBCs have been created. Two RBCs, the New England River Basin Commission and the Ohio River Basin Commission, appear to be fairly similar in area to NEIWPCC and ORSANCO. We find no record of RBCs in the basins covered by DRBC, ICPRB, ISC and SRBC. As a matter of fact, the three newest Compacts - ICPRB (amended 1970), SRBC (1968) and DRBC (1961) all recognize the need for planning and developing water and related resources and are given specific powers in this area. They have the authority to perform RBC functions without the cumbersome committee structure including representatives of each State and 10 federal agencies.

The $200,000,000.00 authorized under Section 209(c) of P.L. 92-500 for the preparation of Level B basin plans will be administered by the Water Resources Council. According to the "Water Resources Council Principles" (38 FR 24778, September 10, 1973), the basin plans will be prepared by existing RBCs, where applicable, and, when there is no existing RBC, by other regional entities at the request of the Council.

The 209(c) funds would appear to be another significant source of funding available to the IWPCCCs without the direct competition with participant States inherent in Section 106 funds. Four commissions - DRBC, SRBC, ICPRB and ISC appear to have excellent chances for the planning funding.

Because ORSANCO and the Ohio River Basin Commission (ORBC) cover approximately the same area, ORSANCO does not appear likely to be assigned the basin planning funding under Section 209(c). The possibility of duplication of effort and personnel and the resultant loss of cost-effectiveness in the Ohio River Valley area appears quite real. The same potential problem has been mitigated in the New England states by the New England Rivers Commission assigning and funding signatory planning responsibilities to NEIWPCC.

A possible solution appears in Section 203(a) of the Act (42 USC 1962b-2), which provides that RBCs will terminate upon the decision of the Water Resources Council or upon agreement of a majority of the member-States in the RBC. Conversely, if there are advantages in the co-existence of contiguous IWPCCCs and RBCs, the Council should consider creation of RBCs to complement the four unpaired IWPCCCs.

SECTION III. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL COMMISSIONS

Through visits with commissions and staffs of IWPCCCs, visits with EPA regional officials, and review of program plans and literature, a picture was developed of which functions each commission is performing, and the extent to which they intend to continue such performance.

Table II and Table III show which functions each commission is performing in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1975 (FY 75) and expects to perform in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1976 (FY 76) in a tabular form to facilitate comparison among commissions.

IWPCCCs often advise signatories on a wide variety of matters but this does not qualify for a "yes" notation; the "yes" is limited to those situations in which the commission actually performs that function, or else where the commission has authority to perform, but directly supervises performance by its delegate.

Further, it is important to note that a "yes" does not mean that the IWPCCC performs this function throughout its entire geographic area - rather that it performs this function somewhere within its area.

Table II
Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission Study

Functions Performed Summary - FY 75

	Functions Commission is Performing in FY 75					
Functions	DRBC	ICPRB	ISC	ORSANCO	NEIWPCC	SRBC
1. Standard Setting	Yes	No	(1)	Yes	Yes	(2)
2. Permitting	No (16)	(3)	(4)	(5)	No	No
3. Surveillance	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
4. Enforcement	No	No	No	No	No	No (6)
5. Operator Training	No	No	Yes (7)	No	Yes	No
6. Water Quality Monitoring						
A. Sample collection	Yes	(8)	Yes	No	No	No
B. Sample analysis	No	(9)	Yes	No	No	No
C. Data Accumulation	Yes	Some	Yes	Yes	No	No
D. Data Interpretation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
7. Planning						
A. Modelling	Yes	Yes (10)	Yes	Yes	No	No W.Q.(11)
B. Waste Load Allocation/	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
C. Other Planning	Yes	Yes		Yes	No	No (12)
8. Miscellaneous	(13)				(14)	(15)

(1) Advisory-ISC has effluent standards; however, state standards are tighter except for oil where ISC has 1 ppm limit.
(2) Advisory
(3) No-cursory review
(4) ISC does not issue permits, yet reviews applications submitted to states
(5) No issuance-but review
(6) No-has power, but does not exercise it
(7) Lab technique only
(8) Just beginning-biological
(9) No-except biological
(10) EPA gave funds to 3 states on condition it be given to ICPRB for modelling main stem
(11) Only quantity
(12) Advisory only
(13) Special studies
(14) Research Demonstration and Investigation, Forum and Legislative (State and Federal)
(15) Flood planning
(16) Strictly speaking, DRBC does not issue a permit. However, it does require a project to go through a procedure similar to that required for a permit.

Table III
Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission Study

Functions Performed Summary - FY 76

Functions	Functions Commission Intends to Perform in FY 76					
	DRBC	ICPRB	ISC	ORSANCO	NEIWPCC	SRBC
1. Standard Setting	Yes	No	(1)	Yes	Yes	(2)
2. Permitting	No (17)	(3)	(4)	No(5)	No	Yes(6)
3. Surveillance	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	(7)
4. Enforcement	No	No	No	No	No	No(8)
5. Operator Training	No	No	Yes(9)	No	Yes	No
6. Water Quality Monitoring						
A. Sample collection	Yes	(10)	Yes	Yes	No	No
B. Sample analysis	No	(11)	Yes	No	No	No
C. Data Accumulation	Yes	Some	Yes	Yes	No	No
D. Data Interpretation/	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
7. Planning						
A. Modelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
B. Waste Load Allocation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes(12)	No
C. Other Planning	Yes	Yes		Yes	No	No (13)
8. Miscellaneous	(14)				(15)	(16)

(1) Advisory-ISC has effluent standards; however, state standards are tighter except for oil where ISC has 1 ppm limit.
(2) Advisory
(3) No-cursory review
(4) Indirectly-ISC does not issue permits, yet reviews applications submitted to states
(5) No - but review
(6) SRBC plans to examine principally non-water quality factors such as diversion, flood plains, etc.
(7) Very small
(8) Has power, but does not exercise it
(9) Lab technique only
(10) Biological
(11) No-except biological
(12) As between states
(13) Advisory only - SRBC does do flood planning and land use planning
(14) Special studies
(15) Research Demonstration and Investigation, Forum and Legislative (State and Federal
(16) Flood Planning
(17) Strictly speaking, DRBC does not issue a permit. However, it does require a project to go through a procedure similar to that required for a permit.

A review of the preceding two tables does not reveal great uniformity of function performance among the commissions. The only functions which are performed by all IWPCCCs is data interpretation; the only one not performed by all is enforcement (although some IWPCCCs have, but are not applying, their enforcement authority).

The staffs of the commissions have provided us with their estimates of resources applied, both in dollars and man-years.

Exhibits XIV through XIX in the Appendix show resources expended by function in dollars, arranged to reveal comparative trends within a given commission covering fiscal years ending June 30, 1972 through 1976 inclusive.

Some difficulties were encountered because the commissions did not have uniform data systems which regularly classified expenditures by function on a basis consistent with other IWPCCCs. However, the estimates are adequate to emphasize again a lack of consistency when viewing all IWPCCCs as a group.

In addition to non-uniformity by function, one also sees non-uniformity reflected in priorities given to resource expenditure.

Exhibits XX through XXV in the Appendix show resources expended by function in man-years, arranged to reveal comparative trends, within a given commission from year ended June 30, 1972 to June 30, 1976 (budgeted).

Here again one sees the wide range of functions performed and priorities given.

In reviewing the implications of these exhibits, such lack of uniformity is bound to raise questions as to how performance of a given function by IWPCCCs fits into the national water pollution control strategy.

Granted, uniformity of application is not always appropriate, but the provocative question remains: if it is not necessary for an IWPCCC to perform a function in one part of the country, why is it necessary in another geographic area?

The quick response is likely to be that "our area is different." Of course, each is different in some aspect; the question then becomes as to what differences are there that justify different institutional vehicles performing a given function.

SECTION IV. DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY STATES AND INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL COMPACT COMMISSIONS

In any given area, there are some functions which are performed by signatories, some that are performed by IWPCCCs, and some that are performed by both.

Those that are performed by both may or may not represent duplication. For example, both may perform monitoring within a commission's geographic area; if the IWPCCC performs monitoring on the main stem of the river, while the state performs monitoring on a tributary, this is duplication of function, but not duplication of function/location.

That this distinction has more than theoretical interest can be better understood if one pictures two monitoring stations 100 feet apart, one operated by a state, the other operated by the commission. At what point are the locations so close together that the second station is wasteful?

Delaware River Basin Commission

In the geographical area covered by the DRBC, the degree of overlap varies depending whether one examines the tributaries or the boundary portion of the main stem.

Table IV and Table V show functions performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1975 and intended to be performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. No change is anticipated on functions performed between the two years studied.

Table IV
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Delaware River Basin Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) Delaware River Basin Commission

Functions	Functions Performed During Year ended 6/30/75								
	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting			x	Not applicable					x
2. Permitting	x						x		
3. Surveillance			x						x[1]
4. Enforcement	x						x		
5. Operator Training	x						x		
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection			x				x		
B. Sample Analysis	x						x		
C. Data Accumulation			x						x
D. Data Interpretation			x						x
7. Planning									
A. Modelling		x					x		
B. Waste Load Allocation		x					x		
C. Other Planning			x						x
8. Miscellaneous									
A. Special Studies			x						x

Notes: [1] In reference to tidal and interstate tributaries and other selected significant cases where deemed necessary

Table V
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Delaware River Basin Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) Delaware River Basin Commission

	Functions Intended to be Performed During Year ending 6/30/76								
	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
Functions	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting			x	Not applicable					x
2. Permitting	x						x		
3. Surveillance			x						x^1
4. Enforcement	x						x		
5. Operator Training	x						x		
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection			x				x		
B. Sample Analysis	x						x		
C. Data Accumulation			x						x
D. Data Interpretation			x						x
7. Planning									
A. Modelling		x					x		
B. Waste Load Allocation		x					x		
C. Other Planning			x						x
8. Miscellaneous									
A. Special Studies			x						x

Notes: [1] In reference to tidal and interstate tributaries and other selected significant cases where deemed necessary.

In the tributaries, there are six functions that are exercised jointly: standard setting, surveillance, monitoring data accumulation, monitoring data interpretation, special studies, and planning (excluding mathematical modelling and waste load allocation).

When one examines the boundary portion of the main stem, sample collection is added as a jointly performed function.

As provided by P.L. 92-500, the DRBC does maintain some standards independent of those set by the signatory states.

Surveillance and sample collection include, in addition to the usual aspects, an unusual situation in that the DRBC contracts with the signatory states for the states to perform some of these services for DRBC. Thus, to some extent, the EPA gives federal funds to the signatory states which, in turn, give them to DRBC which, in turn, give them to the states to perform field surveillance and sample collection.

Both the states and the DRBC are engaged in monitoring data interpretation and planning (other than waste load allocation and mathematical modelling). Joint performance of data interpretation is duplicative, but not harmfully so. The planning function is duplicative but primarily as necessary for the DRBC to integrate state planned portions into the Delaware River basin plan. Special studies are conducted by each, but largely of a non-duplicating nature.

The DRBC does not consider itself to be engaged in performing the permitting function. Nevertheless, project review is required and construction is prohibited until a public hearing is conducted and a "docket number" issued by DRBC. This review would appear to be at least partially duplicative of state activity.

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin

In the geographical area covered by the ICPRB, the degree of overlap varies depending whether one examines the tributaries or the boundary portion of the main stem. Table VI and VII show functions performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1975 and intended to be performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. No change is anticipated between the two years studied in functions performed.

Table VI
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Commission

Functions	Functions Performed During Year ended 6/30/75								
	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting	x			x			x		
2. Permitting	x			x			x		
3. Surveillance	x			x			x		
4. Enforcement	x			x			x	x	
5. Operator Training	x			x			x		
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection	x			x			x		
B. Sample Analysis	x			x			x		
C. Data Accumulation	x			x			x		
D. Data Interpretation		x[1]			x[1]				
7. Planning									
A. Modelling			x			x			x
B. Waste Load Allocation	x			x			x		
C. Other Planning			x			x			x
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes: [1] Exclusively for Baseline Network only (i.e. 50+ stations)

Table VII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin

	Functions Intended to be Performed During Year ending 6/30/76								
	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
Functions	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting	x			x			x		
2. Permitting	x			x			x		
3. Surveillance	x			x			x		
4. Enforcement	x			x			x		
5. Operator Training	x			x			x		
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection	x			x			x		
B. Sample Analysis	x			x			x		
C. Data Accumulation	x			x			x		
D. Data Interpretation		x[1]			x[1]				x
7. Planning									
A. Modelling			x			x			x
B. Waste Load Allocation	x			x			x		
C. Other Planning			x			x			x
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes: [1] Exclusively for Baseline Network only (i.e. 50+ stations)

In the tributaries, there are only three functions that are exercised jointly: monitoring, data interpretation, modelling, and planning (other than waste load allocation).

For the coming year, it is reported that data interpretation on the main stem will be performed exclusively by ICPRB, leaving the functions of modelling and planning to be performed jointly.

Although joint performance of water quality monitoring data evaluation is duplicative, we feel this is advantageous for the reasons outlined in the recommendations listed elsewhere in this report; the value for such duplication applies to the main stem as well as to tributary waters.

Interstate Sanitation Commission

Unlike the majority of IWPCCCs, the unifying concept of the ISC is not the basin of a major river but instead the tidal waters of New York Harbor and neighboring waters bounding the states of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York.

Table VIII and IX show functions performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1975 and intended to be performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1976.

Table VIII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Interstate Sanitation Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) Interstate Sanitation Commission

Functions	Functions Performed During Year ended 6/30/75								
	All Waters of Commission Area			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting			x	Not applicable			Not applicable		
2. Permitting	x[1]								
3. Surveillance		x							
4. Enforcement			x						
5. Operator Training			x						
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection		x[2]							
B. Sample Analysis		x[2]							
C. Data Accumulation		x[2]							
D. Data Interpretation									
7. Planning									
A. Modelling		x							
B. Waste Load Allocation	x								
C. Other Planning			x						
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes:
[1] Commission is delegated considerable part of the work, particularly by New Jersey
[2] Beach samples taken by states and municipalities

Table IX
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Interstate Sanitation Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) Interstate Sanitation Commission

	Functions Intended to be Performed During Year ending 6/30/76								
	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
Functions	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting			x						
2. Permitting	x[1]							Not applicable	
3. Surveillance		x			Not applicable				
4. Enforcement			x						
5. Operator Training			x[3]						
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection		x[2]							
B. Sample Analysis		x[2]							
C. Data Accumulation		x[2]							
D. Data Interpretation			x						
7. Planning									
A. Modelling		x							
B. Waste Load Allocation	x								
C. Other Planning			x						
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes:
[1] Commission is delegated considerable permit review, particularly by New Jersey
[2] Beach samples to be taken by states and municipalities
[3] Not duplicative, ISC trains only in laboratory technique

This commission has a considerably different list of jointly performed functions than the others; they are: standard setting, enforcement, operator training, and basin planning.

Although ISC generally relies on state standards in its area, it can and does set its own standards on occasion - notably a one part per million limitation on oil in effluent discharges.

In its enforcement activities, the Interstate Sanitation Commission cooperates extensively with prosecutors, state and federal, furnishing technical support.

Operator training is provided by instructors who bring a mobile laboratory to plants in the commission area, primarily training operators in laboratory skills. Training of operating skills is left primarily to the states.

To the extent both the states and ISC each review monitoring data and interpet its implications, this is clearly duplicative. As we have mentioned before, we feel this duplication is nevertheless an advantage.

New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

The unifying concept around which the NEIWPCC is organized is not a basin but instead the political boundaries of the six New England States - plus a very small portion of the state of New York in the Lake Champlain area.

Table X and XI show functions performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1975 and intended to be performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1976.

Table X
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

Functions	Functions Performed During Year ended 6/30/75								
	All Waters of Commission Area			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting			x						
2. Permitting	x								
3. Surveillance	x				Not applicable			Not applicable	
4. Enforcement	x								
5. Operator Training			x[1]						
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection	x								
B. Sample Analysis	x								
C. Data Accumulation	x								
D. Data Interpretation			x						
7. Planning									
A. Modelling	x								
B. Waste Load Allocation			x						
C. Other Planning									
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes: [1] Maine relies exclusively on NEIWPCC for operator training

Table XI
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

	Functions Intended to be Performed During Year ending 6/30/76								
	All Waters of Commission Area			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
Functions	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting			x	Not applicable			Not applicable		
2. Permitting	x								
3. Surveillance	x								
4. Enforcement	x								
5. Operator Training			x[1]						
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection	x								
B. Sample Analysis	x								
C. Data Accumulation	x								
D. Data Interpretation			x						
7. Planning									
A. Modelling	x								
B. Waste Load Allocation			x						
C. Other Planning									
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes: [1] Maine expects to rely exclusively on NEIWPCC for Operator Training

The jointly performed functions are: standard setting, operator training, data interpretation, and waste load allocation.

Determination of water quality standards is clearly the responsibility of the signatory states. The NEIWPCC does not set standards of its own; the compact requires that "Each signatory state agrees to submit its classification of its interstate waters to the commission for approval." Thus, the NEIWPCC assists significantly in reconciling differences among the states as to the water quality standards on the various interstate streams in the area.

The NEIWPCC operates an extensive operator training school with an excellent reputation.

Six of the seven member states also provide some form of operator training, although the seventh state, Maine, relies exclusively on the commission for all operator training. There is duplication of function, but not of training type. The commission operates a nine-month resident course; the states operate short or extension courses.

States and commission duplicatively evaluate monitoring data, but do so advantageously.

To the extent each perform waste load allocation, this too is duplication of function. However, the states develop their intrastate and interstate waste load allocation, then they submit them to the commission for approval.

Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission

ORSANCO is another commission organized along the lines of a major river basin. However, as earlier noted, six states which have part of their territory in this basin are not signatories. Thus, the following comments do not apply to all the waters of the basin or all the states in the basin, but only to the signatories.

In the geographical area covered by the ORSANCO, the degree of overlap varies depending whether one examines the tributaries or the boundary portion of the main stem.

Table XII and XIII show functions performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1975 and intended to be performed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1976.

Table XII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission

Functions Performed During Year ended 6/30/75

Functions	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting			x			x	x		
2. Permitting			x			x	x		
3. Surveillance	x			x			x		
4. Enforcement	x			x			x		
5. Operator Training	x			x			x		
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection			x			x			x
B. Sample Analysis			x			x			x
C. Data Accumulation			x			x			x
D. Data Interpretation			x			x			x
7. Planning									
A. Modelling			x			x			x
B. Waste Load Allocation			x		x				x
C. Other Planning			x			x			x
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes:

Table XIII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between Signatory State(s) Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission

Functions	Functions Intended to be Performed During Year ending 6/30/76								
	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting			x			x	x		
2. Permitting			x			x	x		
3. Surveillance			x	x			x		
4. Enforcement	x			x			x		
5. Operator Training	x			x			x		
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection		x			x				x
B. Sample Analysis		x			x				x
C. Data Accumulation		x			x				x
D. Data Interpretation		x			x				x
7. Planning									
A. Modelling			x			x			x
B. Waste Load Allocation			x		x				x
C. Other Planning			x			x			x
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes:

On at least some portion of the tributaries, ORSANCO and the signatories both perform all phases of the monitoring function and all phases of the planning function.

On the boundary portion of the main stem are added as jointly performed functions standard setting, permitting, and surveillance.

Although no new functions as such are being undertaken by ORSANCO in FY 76, a substantial expansion is taking place in monitoring. In the past, primary reliance for monitoring has been placed on robot monitors, continuously measuring four parameters. Now a program is being implemented to collect "grab samples" and drastically expand the number of parameters measured. Further, the extent of tributary monitoring is also being expanded. These expansions are to be taking place with the concurrence of the affected states, and the states are reported to be curtailing state monitoring in the affected areas.

Although ORSANCO does perform some functions in the planning area, the principal responsibility is not with ORSANCO - Section 208 planning is assigned to limited area planning agencies or the states; Section 209 is assigned to the Ohio River Basin Commission (ORBC); Section 303(e) is assigned to the states. ORSANCO participates by providing data and insight from its accumulated files and from staff skills.

The standard setting function performed by ORSANCO has been largely superseded since the passage of P.L. 92-500, but it still provides an advisory function.

To the extent ORSANCO performs the permitting function on the main stem, this is duplicative of that performed by the signatories.

The expansion of the surveillance function in FY 76 duplicates the surveillance function performed by the state (and federal) governments.

Susquehanna River Basin Commission

The SRBC is the most recently formed commission, and has the least number of functions performed on an overlapping basis with its signatories.

As Tables XIV and XV reveal for FY 75 and FY 76 respectively, functions performed jointly with signatories are the same for the main stem or the tributaries.

Although not doing so in the past, through recently adopted regulations, SRBC is initiating a permitting system within FY 76.

Table XIV
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Susquehanna River Basin Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between signatory State(s) Susquehanna River Basin Commission

Functions	Functions Performed During Year ended 6/30/75								
	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting	x			x			x		
2. Permitting	x			x			x		
3. Surveillance	x			x			x		
4. Enforcement	x			x			x		
5. Operator Training	x			x			x		
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection	x			x			x		
B. Sample Analysis	x			x			x		
C. Data Accumulation			x			x			x
D. Data Interpretation			x			x			x
7. Planning									
A. Modelling	x			x			x		
B. Waste Load Allocation	x			x			x		
C. Other Planning	x			x			x		
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes:

Table XV
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency Interviewed: Susquehanna River Basin Commission

A. Analysis of Overlapping Functions Between Signatory State(s) Susquehanna River Basin Commission

	Functions Intended to be Performed During Year ending 6/30/76								
	Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Non-Boundary Portion of Main Stem			Tributaries		
Functions	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint	Exclusively States	Exclusively Inst. Comm.	Joint
1. Standard Setting	x			x			x		
2. Permitting			x			x			x
3. Surveillance	x			x			x		
4. Enforcement	x			x			x		
5. Operator Training	x			x			x		
6. Water Quality Monitoring									
A. Sample Collection	x			x			x		
B. Sample Analysis	x			x			x		
C. Data Accumulation	x			x			x		
D. Data Interpretation			x			x			x
7. Planning									
A. Modelling	x			x			x		
B. Waste Load Allocation	x			x			x		
C. Other Planning	x			x			x		
8. Miscellaneous									

Notes: Susquehanna River Basin Commission is doing some special monitoring using satellites

During FY 75, SRBC, as well as the signatories, has been doing a limited amount of monitoring data accumulation. In FY 76, performance of this function by the commission is scheduled to cease, making moot policy questions concerning this duplication.

Monitoring data interpretation is continuing on a duplicative basis with the signatories, but not, in our estimation, in a manner harmful to effective water pollution control.

The initiation of a permitting function by SRBC represents a potential for unnecessary duplication. As discussed in recommendation #15: "It may be appropriate for an IWPCCC to review permits for water resource management purposes other than water quality. However, in such cases financial support for these functions should not be provided from EPA water quality funds.

SECTION V. EFFECT OF DUPLICATION

An indication of the relative importance of a given function for each commission can be seen from examination of the estimates contained in Table XVI - "Budgeted Dollar Expenditures By Function as a Percentage of Total Water Quality Expenditures," covering FY 75.

As can be seen, these vary considerably among the various commissions. To some extent, this variation may be a result of estimating technique; to some extent, a matter of definition of terms.

Table XVI

Six Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions

Budgeted Dollar Expenditures by Function as a Percentage of Total Water Quality Expenditures

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1975

Functions	DRBC	ICPRB	ISC	NEIWPCC	ORSANCO	SRBC
Standard Setting	0%	0%	9%	4%	1.7%	0%
Permitting	9	0	7.6	0	0	0
Surveillance	43	0	24.3	0	.7	0
Enforcement	2	0	3.8	0	3.6	0
Operator Training	2	0	1.2	43	0	0
Water Quality Monitoring	6	19	9.6	10	63.3	40
Planning	30	23 23[1]	3.8	10	6.1	20
Other	8	31[2] 4[3]	48.8	33	24.6	40[4]

[1] Public Information and Education
[2] Commission Administration and Support
[3] Project Development and Support
[4] Non-point source drainage-30%; Mine drainage 10%

Part IV reviewed and identified various functions performed by each commission which overlapped in varying degrees those performed by signatories. Here again, we find no uniformity in degree of overlap - it varies not only among functions, among commissions, and among states, but even varies by factors such as stream portion: tributaries, non-boundary portion of main stem, and boundary portions of main stem.

The criteria as to whether duplication is productive or wasteful deserves some careful thought.

Duplicated expenditures that provide no additional benefit for the additional expenditures is obviously wasteful. Duplicated expenditures that provide some additional benefit, but not worth the additional expenditure, is also wasteful.

A form of duplicated expenditure which may be justifiable is that in which a function is performed again as a protection against mistakes and oversight. An example occurs in data processing in which the key punch operation is repeated to verify the accuracy of the data entered. Whether such "verifying duplication" is justifiable depends on the cost of duplication, the likelihood of correcting a mistake, and the consequences of an uncorrected mistake.

A second form of justifiable duplication is based on the concept that some duplication is more apparent than real. Earlier reference was made to two monitoring stations 100 feet apart, one operated by a state, the other by a commission. The function performed is clearly duplicated - but the geography is different. That example closed with a question: "At what point are the locations so close together that the second station is wasteful?"

No simple answer can be given because of differing circumstances - for example, it might be justified if the stations were immediately above and below a discharge. The test is not whether some benefit would be derived from expenditures made for that second station; rather it is whether a greater benefit would be received from adding the additional station at some other geographic location.

The job of senior manager has been described as "solving problems wholesale, not retail."

Other than those situations where it is clearly a duplicate expenditure with no benefit whatsoever, attempting to identify which duplicated functions performed are wasteful leads to examining each function in tremendous detail - analyzing "retail, not wholesale."

This practical consideration leads to much of the differences of opinion regarding functions performed both by the interstates and the states.

There is an approach which can offer guidance for more effective water pollution control. Let us return again to the example of two monitoring stations 100 feet apart, operated by different agencies. If the determination of monitoring locations were within the responsibility of one person in one agency, the likelihood of optimum placement would be enhanced, if in separate agencies, the likelihood is diminished.

It is this concept (which has application for broader than just sampling station locations) that accounts for our emphasis on a comprehensive, integrated program assigned as the responsibility to one agency - delegatable at the discretion of the agency having primary responsibility.

P.L. 92-500 has assigned primary responsibility to the states and the state has to perform these functions in that portion of the state within or without the boundaries of an IWPCCC.

Subject to the concept of delegation by the signatories, we conclude that generically speaking, it would invite wasteful duplication for EPA to support performance by the IWPCCCs of the following functions: standard setting, permitting, surveillance, enforcement, operator training, sample collection, sample analysis, water quality data accumulation, and most planning functions.

Although review and interpretation of water quality monitoring data is duplicated in performance by both the IWPCCCs and the signatories, we feel this is not wasteful; the benefits of a "second look" appears worth the modest cost. Similarly, support of the functions of providing coordination and a forum for exchange of ideas, though duplicative, is also worth the modest cost.

In performance of the waste load allocation function, a reasonable division of responsibility is for the states to perform the intrastate allocations, the IWPCCCs to perform the interstate allocations. Expansion by either group into the other's field results in wasteful duplication.

SECTION VI. NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION AND THE INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL COMMISSIONS

Over recent years, the public has become increasingly aware of the problems of water pollution, and this awareness has been translated into governmental action. However, the majority of the public thinks of water pollution in terms of outfalls discharging pollutants into a stream - relatively few are aware of the impact of non-point pollution sources (NPS).

This lack of awareness on the part of the general public has led to a disproportionate emphasis on point source pollution control to the neglect of non-point sources. The disproportionate emphasis is reflected in the current status of laws, regulations, policies, and institutional mechanisms organized to wage an effective program. It is not that the professionals in the field are unaware of the importance of NPS - instead it is a matter of priorities heavily influenced by legislative bodies which rely on public awareness and support.

Now that a systematic approach to point source pollution control is being implemented, increased attention is being given to NPS. The SRBC is currently assisting New York State in an assessment of its NPS problem in the Susquehanna Basin. NEIWPCC is conducting a study of combined sewer overflow in Fitchburg, Massachusetts. (Although there is a difference of opinion as to whether combined sewer overflow should be considered a NPS, there is agreement that combined sewer overflow has not received adequate attention.)

In discussions with staffs of the IWPCCCs, the commissioners, EPA regional officials, and state officials, there was no indication that the IWPCCCs were suited to take primary responsibility for abating this type of pollution within the boundaries of an IWPCCC.

This reflects the provisions of P.L. 92-500 that "it is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution..."

Effective abatement of NPS pollution will require a comprehensive, integrated attack - comprehensive as to area covered, and an integration of the main water pollution control functions: standard setting, permitting, surveillance, enforcement, monitoring, planning, and (perhaps) some form of operator training.

To interject the interstates into the above functions, other than by specific delegation of signatories, would fragment what should be developed as a unified approach.

On the other hand, it is generally conceded that the IWPCCCs can perform a valuable function, particularly in these early stages when the states are concentrating so heavily on point sources.

The potential contribution, as seen by the majority of those interviewed, is that of evaluating the problem, providing research, and conducting demonstration projects.

The key to such utilization lies in the accumulated skills and experience within the IWPCCC organizations, potentially available to undertake a project on relatively short notice.

Such assignment - and funding - could come from EPA or could come from the signatory states.

Assignments could include, but not be limited to, the following list:

a. To develop of a system to quantify the NPS problem in an area.

b. To conduct a study to actually quantify the various aspects of the NPS problem in an area.

c. To develop model legislation for NPS pollution control.

d. To develop model standards for NPS.

e. To develop policies and procedures for field inspections of non-point sources.

f. To develop programs of public participation for encouraging control of NPS.

g. To develop systems for allocating waste loadings from NPS.

h. To develop systems for continuing assessment of progress in controlling NPS.

The IWPCCC have a potential opportunity for assisting in the solution of NPS problems to the benefit of the public, the EPA, the signatories, and the IWPCCCs themselves.

The initiative for applying their talent can come from EPA, the signatory states, or the IWPCCCs themselves.

SECTION VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHICH FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY STATES AND WHICH FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL COMPACT COMMISSIONS

The recommendations have been covered in detail in Chapter IV.

Guidance as to assignment of primary responsibility is clearly set out in P.L. 92-500 - responsibility for a comprehensive, integrated program has been assigned to the states, not to the IWPCCC.

We have recommended that EPA provide funds directly to the IWPCCCs for the following functions:

a. coordination
b. providing forums for informational exchange
c. preparation of mathematical models for the commission areas
d. performing interstate waste load allocations
e. reviewing water quality monitoring data

Because of the dangers resulting from fragmentation of a comprehensive, integrated program, we have recommended that after an interim period of some years that EPA not directly fund IWPCCCs for performing the following functions:

a. standard setting
b. permitting
c. surveillance (field inspection and compliance monitoring)
d. enforcement
e. operator training
f. sample collection
g. sample analysis
h. monitoring data accumulation
i. planning

This does not recommend that the IWPCCC be prohibited from performing these functions. Instead, the recommendations are that EPA should "provide support directly to the states --- relying on the signatories to support...(these)... functions of the IWPCCC at the signatories' discretion."

The IWPCCC are creatures of the signatories; it is appropriate that the signatories have full discretion as to the extent of functions performed by the commissions.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This report opened with a statement concerning the current national water pollution strategy established by enactment of P.L. 92-500, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.

The scope of this study was concentrated on future roles for interstate water pollution control compact commissions, yet the IWPCCCs and this study had to fit within the larger nationwide strategy.

Principal guidance comes from Congressional policy in P.L. 92-500:

> ...that the scope of EPA's activities is primarily water quality management, not water resource management.
>
> ...that water pollution control be administered primarily on political (state) boundaries, not watershed boundaries.
>
> ...that primary responsibility for water pollution control is assigned to the states, not the IWPCCCs.
>
> ...that primary responsibility for basin planning is to be administered through the Water Resources Council, not the interstates.
>
> ...that EPA shall encourage compacts between the States for the prevention and control of pollution.

Water Pollution Control Compact Commissions came into existence long before water pollution control achieved high public interest and they performed a valuable service before a nationwide water strategy was developed.

Now that such a national strategy has been established, it is natural that some changes need to be made in IWPCCC operations. To minimize dislocations, we have recommended that funding changes be made over a period of years. Even these changes may be minimized through assignment of functions to the IWPCCCs by the signatories.

In making our recommendations, we realize that some may be unpopular. The criteria for policy changes should not be popularity; it should be the best assessment as to what would achieve the most effective water pollution control under existing law.

IWPCCCs have had and will continue to have a valuable part to play in water pollution control.

The readjustment period can be an opportunity for IWPCCC commissioners, IWPCCC staff, state officials, and EPA officials to improve the effectiveness of water pollution control.

VI. APPENDIX

Exhibit #1

Individuals With Whom Interviews Were Conducted or From Whom Input Was Received

INTERSTATE COMPACT COMMISSIONS

Delaware River Basin Commission

James F. Wright, Executive Director
Ralph Porges, Chief, Water Quality Branch
Cy Gross, Staff
Arthur Peeck, Chief Administrative Officer

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin

Paul W. Eastman, Executive Director

Interstate Sanitation Commission

Thomas R. Glenn, Jr., Director and Chief Engineer
Dr. Alan Mytelka, Assistant Chief Engineer
Mitchell Wendell, General Counsel

New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

Alfred E. Peloquin, Executive Secretary
Fred Schauffler, Environmental Engineer
Walter J. Shea, Commissioner
Carleton A. Maine, Commissioner
Dr. Gordon R. Pyper, Commissioner
William A. Healy, Commissioner
Thomas A. LaCava, Chairman, Technical Advisory Board

Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission

Leo Weaver, Executive Director and Chief Engineer
Robert Boes, Manager, Technical Services
Edward J. Cleary, Former Executive Director
William Klein, Manager, Surveillance Program
Albert J. Brooks, Treasurer

Susquehanna River Basin Commission

Robert J. Bielo, Executive Director
Jerrald R. Hollowell, Acting Chief, Division of Resources Quality Management-Protection
C. Peter Carlucci, Jr., Counsel and Executive Assistant
Charles Takita, Staff

Individuals With Whom Interviews Were Conducted or From Whom Input Was Received

SIGNATORIES

Connecticut

Robert B. Taylor, Director, Water Compliance and Hazardous Substances, Department of Environmental Protection

District of Columbia

Sylvan Belkov, Chief, Water Quality Division, Department of Environmental Planning and Management
Jean B. Levesque, Director, Water Resources Management Administration, Department of Environmental Planning and Management
John Brink, Chief, Water and Air Pollution Control, Department of Environmental Planning and Management
Malcolm Hope, Director, Office of Environmental Planning and Management, Department of Environmental Services

Illinois

Dr. Richard H. Briceland, Director, Environmental Protection Agency

Massachusetts

John B. Casazza, Supervising Engineer, Water Resources Commission

New Hampshire

William Healy, Executive Director, Water Supply and Pollution Control Commission
Thomas A. LaCava, Deputy Director, Water Supply and Pollution Control Commission

New Jersey

David J. Bardin, Commissioner, Department of Environmental Protection
Rocco D. Ricci, Assistant Commissioner, Division of Water Resources, Department of Environmental Protection
Ernest R. Segesser, Assistant Director, Division of Water Resources, Department of Environmental Protection

Individuals With Whom Interviews Were Conducted or From Whom Input Was Received

New York

Ronald W. Pederson, First Deputy Commissioner, Department of Environmental Conservation
Albert W. Blomberg, Senior Sanitary Engineer, Intergovernmental Relations, Department of Environmental Conservation
Russell C. Mt. Pleasant, Chief, Bureau of Monitoring and Surveillance, Division of Pure Waters, Department of Environmental Conservation
Donald Stevens, Director, Bureau of Standards and Compliance, Department of Environmental Conservation
David W. Burke, Secretary to the Governor

Ohio

Dr. Ira Whitman, Director, Environmental Protection Agency
Earl Richards, Special Assistant to the Director, Environmental Protection Agency

Pennsylvania

Walter Lyon, Chief, Bureau of Water Quality Management, Department of Environmental Resources
Wesley E. Gilbertson, Deputy for Environmental Protection and Regulation, Department of Environmental Resources
Louis Bercheni, Assistant Director for Development and Field Services, Department of Environmental Resources

Rhode Island

Carleton A. Maine, Chief, Division of Water Pollution Control, Environmental Health Services, Department of Health

Vermont

Dr. Gordon R. Pyper, P.E., Commissioner, Agency of Environmental Conservation

Virginia

A. H. Paessler, Deputy Executive Director, Water Control Board
Robert V. Davis, Assistant Deputy Executive Director, Water Control Board
Julian Alexander, Assistant Deputy Executive Director, Water Control Board

Individuals With Whom Interviews Were Conducted or From Whom Input Was Received

U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Division of Water Planning

Mark Pisano, Division Director
Edward Richards, Project Officer
Daniel Petke, Chief, State Programs Branch
Bruce Rosinoff, State Programs Branch
Walter Grosyzk, State Programs Branch
Edmund Notzon, Director, Monitoring and Data Support

Regional Offices

Region I

John A. S. McGlennon, Regional Administrator
Kenneth Johnson, Deputy Regional Administrator
Richard Kotelley, Director, Water Programs Division
Lester A. Sutton, Chief, Air and Water Programs
Stephen Ells, Assistant for Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations
Richard Burns, Chief Economist
Edgar L. Bernard, Chief, Manpower Development
Walter Newman, Chief, Water Quality Branch

Region II

Patrick Harvey, Water Coordinator

Region III

William H. O'Neal, Chief, Program Support Section, Water Program Branch
Edward Geismar, Basin Coordinator, Water Program Branch
Dr. Darwin Alt, Chief, Basin Planning Section, Water Program Branch
Barry Kelly, Program Advisor, Water Program Branch
Daniel Fitzgerald, Chief, Information Systems Analysis Branch
Henry Longest, Chief, Planning Branch

Region V

Francis T. Mayo, Regional Administrator
James Marth, Director, Office of State and Interstate Programs
John Kirkwood, Assistant for Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations
Curtis Ross, Director, Indiana District Office

Individuals With Whom Interviews Were Conducted or From Whom Input Was Received

Miscellaneous

Russell Peterson, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality and former DRBC Commissioner
Donna Mitchell, Assistant to the Chairman, National Commission on Water Quality
Frank Rozich, Director, Water Pollution Control Division, Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators

Exhibit II

Delaware River Basin Commission
Water Quality Monitoring Data Collection System
Source of Monitoring Data
as of 12/31/74

State	**Number of Stations**	**Are any stations regularly operated whose data is not regularly included in Commission data? (yes or no)**
Delaware	40	no
New Jersey	-0- 3	no
New York	2	no
Pennsylvania	75	no
by Commission Personnel	0	no
by Contractors Paid by Commission (4)	38	no
USCGS	8	yes
Federal Agencies	0	no
Local Governments Philadelphia	23	no
New York City	31	yes
All Others	0	no
Total	217	

Notes:

1. **Do not include monitoring stations whose data is not regularly integrated into the Commissions water quality assessments.**

2. **All stations providing data through states to Commission should be included whether operated by state personnel or others.**

(3) Discontinued June 1974
(4) New Jersey - 1
Pennsylvania - 2
Delaware - 17
USGS - 19

Prepared by Dave Pollson
Date February 18, 1975
Telephone 609 / 883-9500

Exhibit III

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin
Water Quality Monitoring Data Collection System
Source of Monitoring Data
as of 12/31/74

State	Number of Stations	Are any stations regularly operated whose data is not regularly included in Commission data? (yes or no)
District of Columbia	3	yes
Maryland	22	yes
Pennsylvania	3	yes
Virginia	16	yes
West Virginia	4	yes
by Commission Personnel	none	no
by Contractors Paid by Commission	none	no
USCGS	1	yes
Federal Agencies (EPA)	1	yes
Local Governments	3	yes
All Others	-	no
Total	53	

Notes:
1. Do not include monitoring stations whose data is not regularly integrated into the Commissions water quality assessments.
2. All stations providing data through states to Commission should be included whether operated by state personnel or others.

Prepared by William T. Mason, Jr.
Date 2/7/75
Telephone 301 / 652-5758

Exhibit IV

Interstate Sanitation Commission
Water Quality Monitoring Data Collection System
Source of Monitoring Data
as of 12/31/74

State	**Number of Stations**		**Are any stations regularly operated whose data is not regularly included in Commission data?** (yes or no)
	Remote	Boats	
Connecticut	0	1	yes
New Jersey	0	0	no
New York	1	0	no
by Commission Personnel	7	45	no
by Contractors Paid by Commission	0	0	no
USCGS	0	0	no
Federal Agencies	0	0	no
Local Governments	0	0	no
All Others	0	0	no
Total	8	46	

Notes:

1. Do not include monitoring stations whose data is not regularly integrated into the Commissions water quality assessments.
2. All stations providing data through states to Commission should be included whether operated by state personnel or others.

Prepared by Alan Mytelka
Date February 14, 1975
Telephone 212 / 582-0380

Exhibit V

New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission
Water Quality Monitoring Data Collection System
Source of Monitoring Data
as of 12/31/74*

State	**Number of Stations**	**Are any stations regularly operated whose data is not regularly included in Commission data? (yes or no)**	
Connecticut	3	yes	Because NEIWPCC uses data for interstate water bodies, not intrastate
Maine	0	yes	
Massachusetts	2	yes	
New Hampshire	(7 for EPA) 14 (7 for own program)	yes	
New York	3	yes	
Rhode Island	2	yes	
Vermont	10	yes	
by Commission Personnel	0	yes	
by Contractors Paid by Commission	0	yes	
USCGS	0	yes	
Federal Agencies	0	yes	
Local Governments	0	yes	
All Others	0	yes	
Total	34		

*Note: 1. Stations are sampled by States for EPA, unless otherwise indicated.
2. Information on this sheet summarized NEIWPCC's plans for an expanded data collection program in FY-75 (compared to previous fiscal year).
3. U.S. Geological Survey has contracts to do trend monitoring for MA and CT.

Notes:

1. **Do not include monitoring stations whose data is not regularly integrated into the Commissions water quality assessments.**
2. **All stations providing data through states to Commission should be included whether operated by state personnel or others.**

Prepared by John Valentino
Date 5 February 1975
Telephone 617 / 261-3758

Exhibit VI

Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission

Water Quality Monitoring Data Collection System
Source of Monitoring Data
as of 12/31/74

State	Number of Stations	Are any stations regularly operated whose data is not regularly included in Commission data? (yes or no)
Alabama	0	no
Georgia	0	no
Illinois	1	no
Indiana	4	no
Kentucky	6	no
Mississippi	0	no
New York	0	no
North Carolina	0	no
Ohio	15	no
Pennsylvania	10	no
Tennessee	0	no
Virginia	1	no
West Virginia	13	no
by Commission Personnel	0	no
by Contractors Paid by Commission	20	no
USCGS	0	no
Federal Agencies	0	no
Local Governments	10	no
All Others	20	no
Total	50	

Notes:

1. Do not include monitoring stations whose data is not regularly integrated into the Commissions water quality assessments.

2. All stations providing data through states to Commission should be included whether operated by state personnel or others.

Prepared by John Donnelly
Date 2-4-75
Telephone 513 / 421-1151

Exhibit VII

Susquehanna River Basin Commission
Water Quality Monitoring Data Collection System
Source of Monitoring Data
as of 12/31/74

State	Number of Stations	Are any stations regularly operated whose data is not regularly included in Commission data? (yes or no)
Maryland	0	Yes
New York	13	Yes
Pennsylvania	13	Yes
by Commission Personnel	0	No
by Contractors Paid by Commission	12	No
USCGS	0	No
Federal Agencies	3	Yes
Local Governments	0	Yes
All Others	2	No
Total	43	

Notes:

1. Do not include monitoring stations whose data is not regularly integrated into the Commissions water quality assessments.
2. All stations providing data through states to Commission should be included whether operated by state personnel or others.

Prepared by Jerrald R. Hollowell
Date February 3, 1975
Telephone 717 / 737-0506

Exhibit VIII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: Delaware River Basin Commission

Receipts and Expenditures

RECEIPTS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72		Actual Year Ended 6/30/73		Actual Year Ended 6/30/74		Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75		Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76	
	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%
U.S. Government										
As Signatory	0		0		0		0		0	
USEPA Grants	200,250	29.1	177,400	26.9	177,400	28.1	177,400	28.1	177,400	28.1
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	200,250	29.1	177,400	26.9	177,400	28.1	177,400	28.1	177,400	28.1
States										
As Signatories	487,354	70.9	480,533	73.1	454,600	71.9	454,600	71.9	454,600	71.9
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	487,354	70.9	480,533	73.1	454,600	71.9	454,600	71.9	454,600	71.9
Other Sources	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Receipts	687,604	100.0	657,933	100.0%	$632,000	100.0%	$632,000	100.0%	$632,000	100.0%
EXPENDITURES	687,604	100.0	657,933	100.0	632,000	100.0	632,000	100.0	632,000	100.0
Excess of Receipts over expenditures	$0	0%	$0	0%	$0	0%	$0	0%	$0	0%

Notes:

Prepared by: Arthur Peck
Title:
Date: February 18, 1975
Telephone: AC 609/ 883-9500

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit IX
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: Interstate Commission on the
Potomac River Basin
4350 East West Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Receipts and Expenditures

RECEIPTS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76 $	%
U.S. Government										
As Signatory ①	20,000	13	34,000	15	34,000	11	52,000	12.7	58,000	14.6
USEPA Grants	45,858	31	76,782	34	120,810	41	194,954 ④	47.0	113,900	28.6
Other	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	45,020 ②	11.3
Total	65,858	44	110,782	49	154,810	52	246,954	59.5	216,920	54.5
States										
As Signatories	83,000	55	113,075	50	141,375	47.5	168,000	40	179,800	45
Other	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
Total	83,000	55	113,075	50	141,375	47.5	168,000	40	179,800	45
Other Sources	1,410	1	2,616	1	1,499	0.5	1,500	0.5	1,500	0.5
Total Receipts	150,268	100	226,473	100.0%	297,684	100	414,954	100	398,220	100
EXPENDITURES										
Excess of Receipts over expenditures	14,893	10	③ (8,205)	(4)	21,827	7	③ (30,284)	(7)	2,400	0.6

Presented by: Mary-Ellen Webster
Title: Administrative Officer
Date: January 23, 1975
Telephone: AC 301 / 652-5758

Notes:
1. Although U.S. Government is not a Signatory to the Compact, it is a participant and appropriates funds annually in partial support of Commission activities.
2. Funds requested in applications to USDI (Office of Water Research & Technology-$13,700) and USDHEW (Div. of Technology and Environmental Education - $31,320)
3. Excess of expenditures over receipts was taken from cash balance available from previous year.
4. Assumes receipt of $24,104 additional funding from FY 74 grant.

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit X
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: INTERSTATE SANITATION COMMISSION

Receipts and Expenditures

RECEIPTS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72		Actual Year Ended 6/30/73		Actual Year Ended 6/30/74		Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75		Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76	
	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%
U.S. Government										
As Signatory	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular USEPA Grants	161,127	36.0	179,041	40.1	218,300	29.3	218,300	26.7	218,300	37.4
* Other	50,000	11.0	0	0	255,000	34.4	288,900	35.3	21,300	3.6
Total	211,127	47.0	179,041	40.1	474,100	63.7	507,200	62.0	239,600	41.0
States										
As Signatories	240,286	53.0	267,000	59.9	269,829	36.3	311,111	38.0	344,444	59.0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	240,286	53.0	267,000	59.9	269,829	36.3	311,111	38.0	344,444	59.0
Other Sources	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Receipts	451,413	100.0%	446,041	100.0%	743,929	100.0%	818,311	100.0%	584,044	100.0%
EXPENDITURES										
Excess of Receipts over expenditures	8,224	2.0%	1,177	2.6%	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes:

*EPA grants for one-time special projects requested
EPA

Prepared by: ______________
Title: ______________
Date: ______________
Telephone: AC___/______________

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XI
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

Receipts and Expenditures

RECEIPTS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76 $	%
U.S. Government										
As Signatory										
USEPA Grants	135,019	39%	249,564	47%	314,806	46%	[2]250,595	81%	[4] 179,600	76%
Other	82,675	24	37,000	7	320,000	47	(3)	0	0	0
Total	217,694	63	286,564	54	634,806	93	250,595	81	179,600	76
States										
As Signatories	48,925	14	54,460	10	50,525	7	54,690	18	54,690	23
Other	[1] 79,531	23	191,336	36	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	128,456	37	245,796	46	50,525	7	54,690	18	54,690	23
Other Sources	3,839	0	2,372	0	4,263	0	3,000	1	3,000	1
Total Receipts	349,989	100%	534,732	100.0%	689,594	100%	308,285	100%	237,290	100%
EXPENDITURES	302,347		450,596		567,827		308,285		237,290	
Excess of Receipts over expenditures	47,642		84,136		121,767		0		0	

Notes: [1] Specially funded State projects in funds or services in kind
[2] Includes 33,021 carryover from prior years
[3] Proposal pending-$500,001
[4] Assumed level of EPA grant based on present allocation

Prepared by: Alfred E. Peloquin
Title: Executive Secretary
Date: February 14, 1975
Telephone: AC 617/ 261-3758

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: OHIO RIVER VALLEY WATER SANITATION COMMISSION

Receipts and Expenditures

	Actual		Actual		Actual		Budgeted		Projected	
	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974		FY 1975		FY 1976	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Prior year carry over	$ 17,575		$ 3,756		$ 8,522		$101,536			
Resources:										
U. S. Government										
As Signatory	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. EPA Grants	$176,576	48.9%	$268,070	54.4%	$268,200	54.2%	$351,049-a)	61.1%	$376,300	49.8%
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	$176,576	48.9%	$268,070	54.4%	$268,200	54.2%	$351,049	61.1%	$376,300	49.8%
States										
As Signatory	$182,000	50.4%	$220,000	44.6%	$220,000	44.5%	$220,000	38.3%	$375,000	49.7%
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	$182,000	50.4%	$220,000	44.6%	$220,000	44.5%	$220,000	38.3%	$375,000	49.7%
Other Sources	$ 2,305	0.7%	$ 4,876	1.0%	$ 6,323	1.3%	$ 3,800	0.6%	$ 3,800	0.5%
Total Revenue	$360,881	100.0%	$492,946	100.0%	$494,523	100.0%	$574,849	100.0%	$755,100	100.0%
tal revenue and carry over	$378,456		$496,702		$503,045		$676,385		$755,100	
xpenditures and obligated funds	$374,700		$488,180		$401,509		$676,385		$755,100	
xcess of Revenue over expenditures	$ 3,756		$ 8,522		$101,536		--		—	

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ote: - (a - Grant of $324,949 has been approved. Remaining $26,100 is subject to availability of funds.
- Fiscal years end June 30

Presented by:
Title: Treasurer
Date: January 29, 197
Telephone: AC 513/421-1151

Exhibit XIII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: Susquehanna River Basin Commission

Receipts and Expenditures

RECEIPTS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76 $	%
U.S. Government										
As Signatory	$75,000	25%	$150,000	24%	$120,000	21%	$150,000	18%	$150,000	21%
USEPA Grants	0	0	0	0	51,884	09	0	0	90,000	13
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	75,000	25	150,000	24	171,884	30	150,000	18	240,000	34
States										
As Signatories	225,000	75	450,000	70	360,000	64	450,000	54	450,000	63
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	225,000	75	450,000	70	360,000	64	450,000	54	450,000	63
Other Sources	0	0	38,448	06	31,067	06	230,690	28	25,000	03
Total Receipts	300,000	100%	638,448	100.0%	562,951	100%	830,690	100%	715,000	100%
EXPENDITURES	278,619		462,403		465,611		830,690		715,000	
Excess of Receipts over expenditures	21,381		212,045		97,340		0		0	

Notes:

Prepared by: Ralph J. Putt
Title: Chief Administrative Officer
Date: 1-13-75
Telephone: AC 717/ 737-0502

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XIV
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: Delaware River Basin Commission

Resources in Dollars

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76 $	%
1. Standard Setting	29,889	4	51,124	8	0[1]	0	0[1]	0	0[1]	0
2. Permitting	0	0	0	0	0	0	54,262	9	55,000	9
3. Surveillance	251,265	37	233,952	36	289,243	46	274,217	43	275,000	43
4. Enforcement	135,901	20	138,166	21	90,836	14	14,075	2	15,000	2
5. Operator Training	3,438	0	2,632	0	7,559	1	10,001	2	10,000	2
6. Water Quality Monitoring	29,600	4	28,100	4	38,000	6	41,000	6	45,000	7
7. Planning	168,751	25	144,745	22	143,700	23	188,252	30	190,000	30
8. Other	68,760	10	59,214	9	62,662	10	50,193	8	42,000	7
Total Water Quality Functions	687,604	100.0%	657,933	100.0%	632,000	100.0%	632,000	100.0%	632,000	100.0%
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Resources:	687,604		657,933		632,000		632,000		632,000	

Notes: [1] Included in planning

Prepared by: Arthur Peck
Title:
Date: February 18, 1975
Telephone: AC 609/ 883-9500

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XV
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin
4350 East West Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Resources in Dollars

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72		Actual Year Ended 6/30/73		Actual Year Ended 6/30/74		Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75		Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76	
	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%
1. Standard Setting	4,757	4%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
2. Permitting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Surveillance	0	0	0	0	5,506	0	0	0	0	0
4. Enforcement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Operator Training	2,695	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. Water Quality Monitoring	11,860	10	18,344	9	30,027	13	70,800	19	60,000	18
7. Planning	14,948	13	58,913	29	49,891	21	85,800	23	73,000	22
P I & E	24,598	21	32,431	16	45,343	19	90,338	23	85,000	26
8. *Other C A & S	59,220	50	83,427	41	95,270	42	118,400	31	100,000	30
P D & S	0	0	9,686	5	7,483	3	12,200	4	12,000	4
Total Water Quality Functions	118,078	100%	202,801	100%	233,520	100%	377,538	100%	330,000	100%
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	17,297		31,877		42,337		67,700		65,820	
Total Resources:	135,375		234,678		275,857		445,238		395,820	

Prepared by: Paul W. Eastman
Title: Executive Director
Date: January 23, 1975
Telephone: AC301/ 652-5758

Notes: *P I & E - Public Information and Education
C A & S - Commission Administration & Support
P D & E - Project Development & Support

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XVI
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: INTERSTATE SANITATION COMMISSION

Resources in Dollars

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76 $	%
1. Standard Setting	5,600	1.2%	6,700	1.5%	7,300	.9%	7,400	.9%	7,400	1.2
2. Permitting	13,700	3.1	15,600	3.5	34,200	4.6	62,500	7.6	62,500	10.
3. Surveillance	154,500	34.2	177,500	39.8	194,300	26.1	198,500	24.3	198,500	36.
4. Enforcement	34,900	7.7	55,300	12.4	39,100	5.3	31,200	3.8	31,500	5.
5. Operator Training	9,600	2.1	11,200	2.5	7,300	.9	9,500	1.2	9,600	1.
6. Water Quality Monitoring	48,200	10.7	62,000	13.9	72,700	10.0	78,900	9.6	92,900	16.
7. Planning	26,900	6.0	31,200	7.0	31,200	4.2	31,200	3.8	31,500	5.
8. Other	158,013	35.0	86,541	19.4	357,829	48.1	399,111	48.8	133,244	22.
Total Water Quality Functions	451,413	100.0%	446,041	100.0%	743,929	100.0%	818,311	100.0%	594,044	100.
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS										
Total Resources:										

Notes:

Prepared by: ____________
Title: ____________
Date: ____________
Telephone: AC___/____________

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XVII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

Resources in Dollars

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72		Actual Year Ended 6/30/73		Actual Year Ended 6/30/74		Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75		Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76	
	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%
1. Standard Setting	5,379	2%	6,921	2%	12,619	2%	10,800	4%	1,187	.5%
2. Permitting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Surveillance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Enforcement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Operator Training	115,240	38	95,345	21	105,188	19	132,314	43	140,000	59
6. Water Quality Monitoring[2]	10,757	3.5	13,842	3	25,237	4	30,829	10	23,729	10
7. Planning	10,757	3.5	39,336		272,914[3]	48	30,829	10	23,729	10
8. Other	160,214	53	295,152	65	151,869	27	103,513	33	48,645	20.5
Total Water Quality Functions	302,347	100%	450,596	100%	567,827	100%	308,285	100%	237,290	100.0
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Resources:	302,347	100%	450,596	100%	567,827	100%	308,285	100%	237,290	100%

Notes: [1] "Other" includes general administration plus study and demonstration projects
[2] Data analysis and dissemination
[3] Includes Nashua River Program

Prepared by: Alfred E. Peloquin
Title: Executive Secretary
Date: February 17, 1975
Telephone: AC 617/ 261-3758

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XVIII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: OHIO RIVER VALLEY WATER SANITATION COMMISSION

Resources in Dollars

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	**FY 1972** $	%	**FY 1973** $	%	**FY 1974** $	%	**FY 1975** $	%	**FY 1976** $	%
1. Standard Setting	$ 20,977	5.6%	$ 21,979	4.5%	$ 13,712	3.4%	$ 11,300	1.7%	$ 12,600	1.7%
2, Permitting	—		—		—		—		—	
3. Surveillance (Aeriel and boat surveillance, spill and hazard alerts)	94	0	302	0	491	.1	5,000	.7	10,000	1.3
4. Enforcement	7,922	2.1	26,190	5.4	22,761	5.7	24,200	3.6	26,700	3.5
5. Operator Training	—		—		—		—		—	
6. Water Quality Monitoring	83,426	22.3	74,586	15.3	71,241	17.7	205,485	30.4	242,700	32.2
a. Data processing & Evaluation	121,200	32.3	175,367	35.9	131,666	32.8	222,800	32.9	239,000	31.7
7. Planning	18,450	4.9	19,568	4.0	26,486	6.6	41,400	6.1	46,300	6.1
8. Other										
a. Public Information & Liaison	27,301	7.4	48,465	9.9	38,370	9.6	43,100	6.4	52,300	6.9
b. Administrative & Executive	95,330	25.4	98,323	20.2	96,782	24.1	123,100	18.2	125,500	16.6
c. Special Study (Organics)	—		23,400		—		—		—	
Total Water Quality Function	$374,700	100%	$488,180	100%	$401,509	100%	$676,385	100%	$755,100	100%
Non Water Quality Function	—		—		—		—		—	
Totals	$374,700		$488,180		$401,509		$676,385		$755,100	

Prepared by: S. J. Brooks Title: Treasurer Date: January 29, 1975 Telephone: AC 513/421-1151

Exhibit XIX
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: Susquehanna River Basin Commission

Resources in Dollars

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73 $	%	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74 $	%	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75 $	%	Budgetec Year Ende 6/30/76 $	
1. Standard Setting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(
2. Permitting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(
3. Surveillance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C
4. Enforcement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Operator Training	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. Water Quality Monitoring	0	0	16,000	37.8	29,460	23.0	72,000	40.0	72,000	40.0
7. Planning	0	0	20,264	48.0	28,200	22.0	36,000	20.0	36,000	20.0
					48,173[2]	37.7	54,000[2]	30.0	54,000[2]	30.0
8. Other			6,000[3]	14.2	22,136[3]	17.3	18,000[3]	10.0	18,000[3]	10.0
Total Water Quality Functions	0	0	42,264	100.0	127,969	100.0	180,000	100.0	180,000	100.0
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS										
Total Resources:										

Notes:

2 - Non-point source pollution
3 - Mine drainage

Prepared by: J. Hallowell
Title: Ground Water Geologist
Date: 1-8-75
Telephone: AC 717/ 737-0506

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XX
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: Delaware River Basin Commission

Resources in Man-Years

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76
1. Standard Setting	3.3	6.3	0[1]	0[1]	0[1]
2. Permitting	0	0	0	1.5	1.5
3. Surveillance	2.0	2.0	3.25	3.0	3.0
4. Enforcement	3.5	3.7	2.63	0.375	0.37
5. Operator Training	0.5	0.2	0.25	0.25	0.25
6. Water Quality Monitoring	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
7. Planning	3.8	3.8	4.12	5.50	5.50
8. Other	1.4	1.5	1.75	1.375	1.38
Total Water Quality Functions	15.0	18.0	12.5	12.5	12.5
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS			0	0	0
Total Resources:	15.0	18.0	12.5	12.5	12.5

Notes: [1] Included in planning

Prepared by: Arthur Peck
Title:
Date: February 18, 1975
Telephone: AC 609/ 883-9500

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XXI
Interstate Water Pollution
Control Commission Study

Agency: Interstate Commission on the
Potomac River Basin
4350 East WEst Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20014

Resources in Man-Years

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS		Actual Year Ended 6/30/72	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76
1. Standard Setting		0.2	0	0	0	0
2. Permitting		0	0	0	0	0
3. Surveillance		0	0	0.2	0	0
4. Enforcement		0	0	0	0	0
5. Operator Training		0.1	0	0	0	0
6. Water Quality Monitoring		0.5	0.6	1.4	2.5	2.0
7. Planning		0.4	1.9	1.7	2.9	2.5
8. * Other	P I & E	1.0	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.5
	C A & S	3.5	3.1	2.9	3.5	3.5
	P D & S		0.3	0.2	0.5	0.5
Total Water Quality Functions		5.7	7.5	8.2	11.0	11.0
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS		0.8	1.3	1.4	2.0	2.0
Total Resources:		6.5	8.8	9.6	13.0	13.0

Prepared by: Paul W. Eastman
Title: Executive Director
Date: January 23, 1975
Telephone: AC 301/ 652-5758

Notes: * P I & E = Public Information and Education
C A & S = Commission Administraion & Support
P D & E = Project Development & Support

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XXII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: INTERSTATE SANITATION COMMISSION

Resources in Man-Years

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76
1. Standard Setting	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
2. Permitting	.7	.7	1.4	2.6	2.6
3. Surveillance	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.3	8.8
4. Enforcement	1.8	2.5	1.6	1.3	1.3
5. Operator Training	.5	.5	.3	.4	.4
6. Water Quality Monitoring	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.3	3.8
7. Planning	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
8. Other	5.6	3.9	4.2	4.6	4.6
Total Water Quality Functions	20.8	20.1	20.1	22.1	23.1
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS					
Total Resources:					

Notes:

Prepared by: ____________
Title: ____________
Date: ____________
Telephone: AC___/____________

WLB:hlg
12/13/74

Exhibit XXIII
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission

Resources in Man-Years

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76
1. Standard Setting	1.0	1.0	.5	.5	.5
2. Permitting	0	0	0	0	0
3. Surveillance	0	0	0	0	0
4. Enforcement	0	0	0	0	0
5. Operator Training	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.4
6. Water Quality Monitoring[2]	.5	.5	.9	.9	.9
7. Planning	1.0	3.5	5.2[3]	5.9	1.0
8. Other	12.1	10.6	5.0	6.2	6.0
Total Water Quality Functions	23.0	24.0	20.0	21.9	16.8
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	0	0	0	0	0
Total Resources:	23.0	24.0	20.0	21.9	16.8

Notes: [1] "Other" includes general administration plus study and demonstration projects
[2] Data analysis and dissemination
[3] Includes Nashua River program

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Exhibit XXIV
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: OHIO RIVER VALLEY WATER SANITATION COMMISSION

	Resources in Man-Years				
WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	FY 1972	FY 1973	FY 1974	FY 1975	FY 1976
1. Standard Setting	1-1/8	1-1/8	5/8	1/2	1/2
2. Permitting	0	0	0	0	0
3. Surveillance (Aerial and boat surveillance; spill and hazard alerts)	0	0	0	1/4	1/2
4. Enforcement	1/4	3/8	1/8	1/8	1/8
5. Operator Training	0	0	0	0	0
6. Water Quality Monitoring	1-5/8	1-3/4	1-3/8	2-3/4	4
a. Data Processing and Evaluation	4-1/8	4-3/8	5	7-3/4	9-1/4
7. Planning	1	1	1-1/4	1-1/2	1-1/2
8. Other					
a. Public Information and Liaison	1	1-1/4	1-1/2	2-1/8	2-5/8
b. Administration and Executive	3-7/8	4-1/8	3-5/8	4	4-1/2
c. Special Study (Organics)	0	0	0	0	0
NON WATER QUALITY	0	0	0	0	0
Total Resources:	13	14	13-1/2	19	23

Prepared by: Elbert J. Brooks
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Exhibit XXV
Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission Study

Agency: Susquehanna River Basin Commission

Resources in Man-Years

WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	Actual Year Ended 6/30/72	Actual Year Ended 6/30/73	Actual Year Ended 6/30/74	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/75	Budgeted Year Ended 6/30/76
1. Standard Setting	0	0	0	0	0
2. Permitting	0	0	0	0	0
3. Surveillance	0	0	0	0	0
4. Enforcement	0	0	0	0	0
5. Operator Training	0	0	0	0	0
6. Water Quality Monitoring	0	0	0	0	0
7. Planning	0	1	1	1½	1½
8. Other	0	1	2	4½	4½
Total Water Quality Functions	0	2	3	6	6
NON WATER QUALITY FUNCTIONS	0	0	0	0	0
Total Resources:	0	2	3	6	6

Notes:

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12/13/74

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